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ABSTRACT
Eastern Promises: Poland’s Role as a Regional Actor in the
European Union’s Eastern Policy- the Example of Belarus
Max David Reinke
The present thesis will analyze Poland’s current and potential role as an effective regional
actor in mediating the European Union’s (EU) relations with its easternmost neighbors. In order
to most accurately assess this, this thesis will examine Poland’s relationship with Belarus,
specifically democratization efforts and forging a strong, resolute association with the European
Union. Being a successful post-communist transition state and recent EU Member State, Poland
has for some time seen itself to be the most-qualified country to bridge Eastern and Western
Europe. Belarus in particular is a country of concern for the Polish government because it is a
bordering country with a long historical relationship to Poland and contains an ethnic Polish
minority. This thesis will discuss and evaluate the previous and current initiatives the European
Union and Poland are taking in Belarus, their level of success, and will postulate who would be
poised to be the most efficacious (external) player in the country’s progress towards democratic
consolidation and good governance. By using the example of Belarus this thesis will also expand
the current literature on the ability of Member States (particularly newer ones) to influence
policymaking in Brussels.
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INTRODUCTION: NO MAN IS AN ISLAND
Regionalism in the European Union

The European Union (EU) is an unprecedented experiment not only in Europe but also in
the world. What started as a vehicle for economic cooperation among an exclusive cluster of
Western European states has evolved into a supranational global actor. Both internally and
externally, the process of EU enlargement has had a dramatic effect on the European Union. The
boundaries of the EU have expanded in nearly every direction, and as a result, the European
Union has had to adjust accordingly. This transformation has not only affected the internal
structure of the EU—the Union‟s approach towards neighboring countries also had to evolve.
The English poet John Donne once said that “no man is an island.” Like man, no country in
today‟s integrated and globalized world can thrive while isolated from others. For Europe, its
bordering countries are important for security, transport, trade, markets, and stability. As the EU
continues to grow, so do its responsibilities. The European Union is now an important global
actor; therefore EU external policy is an exigent concern for Brussels. The provisions for a
Common Foreign Security Policy, first introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, was the
first step in the European Union adopting a concrete strategy for external relations. Also in the
Treaty of Amsterdam was the Union‟s commitment to upholding democratic principles and the
protection of human rights and certain fundamental freedoms. As the “Arab Spring” democratic
revolutions in North Africa and the Middle East have demonstrated, the Union intends to make
the respect for democratic principles a primary component of foreign relations as well as internal
affairs. Furthermore, these revolutions have proven that what happens outside of the EU has a
direct impact on the European Union. Because of this, the EU‟s actions (or inactions) in these
circumstances have both immediate and far-reaching consequences.
Since the European Union expanded into Central and Eastern Europe through the first
decade of the new millennium, the EU‟s territorial border is now flush with Russia and its
influence extends into the Caucasus region and Central Asia. While these countries tend to be
less developed, poorer, and politically unstable, the potential for these states and their people
cannot be discounted. Due to the abundant natural resources prevalent in this region, Europe‟s
energy security is contingent on healthy relations with Russia and other surrounding countries. It
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is therefore essential for the European Union to formulate a comprehensive eastern policy.
During the Cold War many of these countries were a part of the Soviet Union, so they were
unquestionably within the Russian sphere of influence. Even though the Cold War ended,
Europe‟s engagement with the region has changed little. How can this divide between the EU
and the east be bridged, and who can most effectively do it?
Poland is keen to be this bridge. Taking into account a number of factors, it would make
sense that Poland would be poised to take on this role as connecting Eastern and Western
Europe. Poland‟s ability to adopt a free-market democratic system is widely credited as being
one of the most successful in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, it has recent and firsthand
experience with the trials and tribulations of transforming a planned economy and authoritarian
government into a liberal, western-style democracy and functioning market economy. Poland
was the largest country in the 2004 EU enlargement and is currently the sixth most populous
country in the European Union. Additionally, being a Slavic, Central European state, Poland has
historical, linguistic, and cultural ties to several countries in Eastern Europe. While these
indicators would make it clear that Poland would be a very suitable country to bridge the
European Union with the east, has Poland capitalized on this opportunity?
This thesis will argue that as a successful post-communist transition state, Poland has the
opportunity to become a major player in the EU‟s external relations with Eastern Europe. To
prove this, this thesis will analyze both Poland and the EU‟s development assistance methods
with the Eastern European country of Belarus. By inspecting and evaluating assistance to
Belarus, particularly democratization efforts, at both the bilateral and European level, this thesis
will highlight whether Poland has the ability to mediate a strong relationship between the EU and
Eastern Europe, including Belarus.
Why Belarus? Belarus has been a peculiar state in the post-communist era. While the fall
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War triggered a host of new democratic
governments around the world, Belarus remains unaffected by this wave of democracy. While
the question for many post-communist European states is the level of progress in transitioning to
democracy, Belarus‟s current political and economic status has barely changed since its days as a
Soviet republic; Belarus‟s democratic maturation has stagnated and the country has slipped back
into authoritarianism. Additionally, while many formerly communist states eagerly oriented their
foreign policy to be pro-western and pro-European (Poland, perhaps, the most so), Belarus‟s
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leadership continues to look eastward towards the Russian Federation for political, economic,
and military cooperation and support. Because of these factors, Belarus has been pejoratively
dubbed “the last dictatorship in Europe.” For much of the EU‟s history, Belarus has been on the
fringe of policy concerns. With the Union‟s enlargement in 2004, however, Belarus borders three
EU Member States. What is the nature of the European Union‟s presence in Belarus, how
efficacious has the EU been in forging a stable association with Belarus, and in future initiatives
who specifically would be the most effective (external) player in aiding democracy and good
governance in Belarus?
Scholarly studies on Member States‟ influence in shaping EU foreign policy are few and
far-between. While attention to the Union‟s external policy is steadily increasing in both
academic and political discourse, the scope of the conversation usually pertains to the “big
picture.” All too often the focus is how Brussels should act towards clusters of countries with
varying political structures, histories, and cultures. While this would be an appropriate analysis
for a traditional relationship between two states, the sui generis nature of a supranational
institution‟s interaction with third-party countries requires an alternative perspective. In 2008,
Dr. Nathaniel Copsey from the University of Birmingham and Dr. Karolina Pomorska from the
University of Maastricht wrote a paper titled “Poland‟s Power and Influence in the European
Union: the case of its Eastern Policy.” Presented at the American Political Science Association
conference in Boston, the paper concluded, after meticulous research, that even though Poland
aspires to play a hands-on role in EU policymaking towards the east, it has been ineffective in
achieving this goal. Some of the reasons the two authors cited for this shortcoming are Poland‟s
inefficient national bureaucracy, the unpreparedness of Polish diplomats to network when they
first arrived in Brussels, the adverse stereotypes of Poles (and at that time the negative press
coverage of the conservative Kaczyński government) in Europe, and an overall lack of clout of
Poland compared to more established Member States like France and Germany.1
While the conclusions derived from this paper present an accurate assessment of Poland‟s
inability to rise in the EU hierarchy, much has happened since 2008 that needs to be taken into
consideration. In terms of EU policy, the most ambitious program in Eastern Europe undertaken
by the EU ever, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) had not been officially launched at the time of
1

Nathaniel Copsey and Karolina Pomorska, “Poland’s Power and Influence in the European Union: the Case of its
Eastern Policy” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston,
Massachusetts, August 30, 2008).
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Copsey and Pomorska‟s paper. Additionally, Poland had yet to hold the Presidency of the
Council of the European Union, a position that would make Poland a strategic director of EU
policy. The Presidency requires years of planning and is not only an excellent learning
experience on how to handle the inner-workings of the Union but also showcases the strengths
and leadership capabilities of individual Member States in the Union.
Changes occurred not only in Poland‟s relationship to the European Union but also
within Poland itself. The new Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, has ushered in a number of
changes within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Such innovations include consolidating
diplomatic missions abroad while bolstering strategically important embassies (such as in
Brussels, London, and Kiev), digitalizing the Foreign Ministry and its offices abroad, and
absorbing the office dedicated to Poland‟s EU integration into the MFA. These structural,
organizational, and technological upgrades are all designed to streamline Poland‟s foreign
representation and allow Poland to be more efficient in its endeavors abroad. Also cited in
Copsey and Pomorska‟s article was Poland‟s weak economy translating into insufficient leverage
at the EU level compared to other powerful European states. During the European economic
crisis in 2009, Poland was the only country in the European Union that did not undergo a
recession and in fact experienced economic growth. Poland continues to grow, and advocates
stronger intra-EU trade, completing the Single Market, and other pro-European solutions for
stimulating the European economy.
In addition to contributing to the literature pertaining to the evolution of EU external
policy and Member States‟ influence on said policy, this thesis also aims to provide an up-to-date
and comprehensive assessment on Belarus. With Belarus and its relationship to the EU, the
literature available in English is minimal compared to other Central and Eastern European states.
Based on the preliminary research conducted for this thesis, the literature that is published covers
such topics as the formulation of Belarusian national identity, Belarus‟s historical and modern
relationship with Russia, and the country‟s controversial president, Aleksandr Lukashenko.
Furthermore, there are a number of works in scholarly journals pertaining to issues such as the
construction of civil society in Belarus. However, there have been several recent developments
in Belarus that are important in understanding the Belarus‟s struggle for democracy and the
international response. The appallingly illegitimate December 2010 presidential “election” in
Belarus and the brutal crackdown on civilians that ensued, Belarus‟s souring relationship with
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Russia, and the economic/ currency crisis are all significant game-changers for EU-Belarus
relations. With the European Union‟s very nascent Common Foreign and Security Policy
coupled with the diversity of those countries deemed to be in the European neighborhood, what
would be the best solution: centralized decision-making and execution or addressing and
managing relations at a regional level?
The conceptual underpinning of this thesis to examine regional actors and their influence
on EU policy was inspired by the article “The Age of Nonpolarity” by the President of the
Council of Foreign Relations, Richard N. Haass. Also written in 2008, Haass theorizes that since
the beginning of the twentieth century, the balance of power in the world has shifted in several
distinct patterns. Before the World Wars, global politics was multipolar, with the concentration
of power held by various empires and states around the world. After 1945, however, the world
became decidedly bipolar, with the United States and the Soviet Union competing for power and
influence, particularly in the developing world. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the
US emerged as the world superpower and enjoyed two decades as the leader of the new, unipolar
world order. Now, it appears as if power is once again spread out amongst a myriad of different
entities to the extent that no one agent or agents dominate the international arena. In essence, the
world has become nonpolar.2
While nonpolarity may appear identical to multipolarity, the emphasis in a nonpolar
world is not concentration of power and influence, but rather the distribution of power and
influence. Also, the decline of states as the primary decision-makers in global systems is also an
important aspect in the nonpolar paradigm. States now compete with international organizations,
NGOs, multinational corporations, and interest groups for power at every level. While power is
now in the hands of a variety of newcomers, Haass observes that the world is also seeing a
decrease in the efficacy of traditional superpowers and witnessing a surge of regional powers.
The historical global leaders like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan are being
rivaled by countries like Brazil, China, India, Nigeria, and Turkey. On every continent, new
countries are growing to be regional powerhouses and expanding their sphere of influence
through political, economic, and social instruments. Much like Venezuela in South America or
Pakistan in the Middle East/ South Asia, this thesis predicts that Poland will rise as a regional
power in the EU and particularly in directing EU policy towards Eastern Europe.
2

Richard N. Haass, “The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow US Dominance?” Foreign Policy, May/ June 2008.
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Addressing regionalism in the creation and implementation of EU policy corresponds
well with the salience of regions in the evolution of the European Union. While the EU is
increasingly adopting responsibilities that are normally reserved for nation-states, EU structural
reforms reflect a trend towards decentralization and emphasizing Europe‟s regions. All actions
taken by the European Union uphold the principle of subsidiarity, which dictates that decisions
made in Europe should take place and be implemented at the lowest level of governance
possible. The Committee of the Regions, also established in the Treaty of Amsterdam, allows
local and regional officials access to European institutions and policymakers in Brussels. The
European Commission created and continues to finance programs such as Interreg and ECOSOuverture that promote partnership and information exchange amongst regions in Europe.
Billions of euros every year are directed towards regional development funds; structural funds
like the Union‟s Cohesion Fund and the European Regional Development Fund are second only
to agricultural subsidies in the amount of money allocated to the European budget.
Much of this effort in promoting a “Europe of the regions” is concentrated on regions
within Member States. However, in the European Union, macro-regions are also growing in
number, size, and influence. Cross-border regions in Europe are steeped in cultural, historical,
and ethnic traditions. SaarLorLux, Cataluña, Basque Country, and Rhône-Alps are all recognized
regions that include multiple nation-states. Macro-regions are organizing into political and
economic cooperatives. The Council of the Baltic Sea States, the Visegrad Group, the Weimar
Triangle, and the Nordic Council are just a few of the examples of region-based cooperatives
involved in advocating regional concerns and problems at the national, European, and
international level. If Europe‟s regions are reorganizing and reinvigorating in such a way, then
why couldn‟t regional powers rise and take on new responsibilities in the European Union?
My thesis will be divided into three chapters. The first chapter will examine the historical
relationship of Poland and Belarus. Understanding not only the history of these two countries but
a general history of Belarus is central to many of the issues that continue to affect contemporary
political relations with Belarus and its neighbors. The analyzed relationship between Poland and
Belarus will also provide the basis for the argument that Poland can be the bridge between the
EU and Belarus, since Poland at numerous points throughout history has linked Eastern Europe
with Western Europe. Moving into more recent history, the second chapter of my thesis will
review and describe the current relationship between Belarus and Poland. The chapter will begin
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with the optimistic cooperation immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union, then
track and analyze the series of events contributing to Poland‟s deteriorating relationship with
Belarus. At the time of this thesis, Poland-Belarus relations politically are strained, but Poland
continues to support democratic development in Belarus. Seeing civil society as the key to social
change and essential to a steady, mature democracy, Poland channels assistance to Belarus
through the support of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), independent media, study visits,
etc. The remainder of chapter two will describe these ventures and how effective they have been.
Since the second chapter will be dedicated strictly to Poland and Belarus, the third
chapter will explore the European Union‟s relationship with Belarus. As mentioned, the
European Union is looking to become more engaged in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus region, and
Central Asia. While a brief overview of the previous programs will be included in this chapter,
much of the analysis will be dedicated to the EU Neighbourhood Policy. For the purposes of the
EU‟s relationship with the east, special attention will be given to the Eastern Partnership, a
project which intends to nurture democratization and economic prosperity in the region as well
as spread European standards and values to post-communist transition states across Eastern
Europe and Eurasia. Because the focus of this thesis is Poland‟s role in bridging the east and the
west, their contribution towards the Eastern Partnership and other initiatives will be highlighted.
Following the third chapter will be the concluding remarks. After a synopsis of the findings, the
thesis will finish with an overall assessment of Poland‟s role as a regional actor bridging the EU
and Belarus. This part of the thesis will review what has worked, what has not worked, and how
Poland, the EU, and others can learn from past experience in helping shape future programs in
Belarus and perhaps even other states undergoing a similar transition.
As will be described in more detail in the first chapter, the Belarusian nation has been
plagued by marginalization and persistent foreign influence throughout much of its existence.
This has affected many facets of Belarusian identity, language being one of them. One of the
vestiges of Soviet/ Russian domination over Belarus is that Belarusian as a language was
persistently overshadowed by Russian. In a country where only eleven percent of the population
is ethnically Russian, more than 60 percent of the population uses Russian as their primary
language of communication; not even the current president of Belarus speaks Belarusian
correctly. Because of the lack of legitimacy of Belarusian as a written and spoken language for
so long, there exists a variation of spellings for many Belarusian names and places. The spelling
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inconsistencies are further exacerbated by the process of transliteration from Belarus, written in
Cyrillic, to languages that use Roman characters. In fact, the differentiated spellings between
Russian and Belarusian came about as a polite gesture by Poles to legitimize Belarus as a nationstate separate from Russia or other Slavic nations. Nevertheless, for an individual reading any
literature about Belarus, the multiple spellings can be confusing and misleading. Using the
example of the current Belarusian president, Aleksandr Lukashenko, his first name could be
spelled Alexander, Aleksandr, Alyaksandr, or Aliaksandr, and his surname can be spelled
Lukashenko, Lukashenka, or Łukaszenka. For the purposes of uniformity, in text this thesis will
spell the president‟s name as it is spelled on official US government websites, Aleksandr
Lukashenko. Other names and locations will be spelled in the way that they appear in the source.
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CHAPTER 1: BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE
Historical Dynamic of Poland and Belarus

Source: Historical Dictionary of Belarus by Jan Zaprudnik

Poland and Belarus are neighboring countries situated in a region defined as Central and
Eastern Europe. Over the centuries, this part of the world has been continually reshaped by war,
conquest, and migration. Therefore, it is no surprise that these two countries share much more
than just a 399 km border.1 Prominent Polish historical figures such as Tadeusz Kosciuszko were
born in Belarusian lands.2 Also, substantial parts of modern-day Belarus were once under Polish
rule. As a result, the concept of Belarus as a nation and as a state was heavily influenced by
1
2

Jan Zaprudnik, Historical Dictionary of Belarus (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 1998), 1.
Andrew Savchenko, Belarus: A Perpetual Borderland (Leiden: Koninklijke, Brill NV, 2009), 37.
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Polish language, culture, and faith. Poland and Belarus have a deeply entrenched historical
relationship, and in order to understand what will happen between these two countries, it is
paramount to understand what has happened. For the purposes of this thesis, the role that Poland
can play as a regional actor between Europe and Belarus can be more thoroughly understood
given the precedent that Poland has set as Belarus‟s gateway to the west.
In the early history of Belarus, it is important to keep in mind the evolution of
nationalism in Europe and how societies define people today compared to how those people
defined themselves in the past. Our contemporary notion of what makes someone a “Pole” or a
“Belarusian” is different from the middles ages when many other factors determined identity.
Oftentimes, people preferred the more neutral appellation, “local.” With a country that had no
precedence of statehood such as Belarus, these monikers have important implications. To
simplify the text of this chapter, contemporary titles for the ethnic groups involved will be
employed and explanatory caveats will be added if necessary. Nevertheless, to fully comprehend
what transpired during this period, it is crucial to let go of the current notion of nationality and
approach these countries and the populations within them from a new (or rather, old) perspective.
Building upon literature by historians Timothy Snyder, Andrew Savchenko, and Jan
Zaprudnik, the content of this chapter will be framed by the concept of Belarus as a “borderland”
country. The borderland theory explains that Belarus and Belarusians have for centuries existed
along the periphery of regional and global powers. Being located along this frontier has had a
huge influence on the history and development of Belarus. More often than not, Belarusians‟ fate
has been left to the decisions of outsiders, leaving them with little say or control over their
destinies. The concept of a borderland is especially important in understanding the history of
Belarus during the 19th and 20th centuries when this geopolitical borderland became the frontline
of several devastating wars. It is also because of the position of Belarus as a borderland that the
historical relationship with a third country, Russia, will be frequently discussed. A sufficient
assessment of Belarusian history would be impossible without taking into account Russia. In
fact, given the objective of this thesis, understanding Belarus-Russia history is just as important
as understanding Belarus-Poland history. Belarus‟s history as a borderland country can be
characterized by the idiom “between a rock and a hard place.” Much like how Poland‟s history
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has been determined by being located between Russia and Germany, so has Belarus‟s history
bared the brunt of being geopolitically sandwiched between Russia and Poland.3

I.

The Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was a multiethnic, multi-confessional state in the medieval
and early modern era of European history. At the height of its power, the Grand Duchy reached
from the Baltic to the Black Sea and encompassed, in part or in whole, Lithuania, Latvia,
Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus.4 In 1385, the Lithuanian Grand Duke Jagiello married the teenage
queen of Poland, Jadwiga, at Krewa. The marriage between these two ruling families, known as
the Krewa Union, brought together Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Krewa Union
marks the first instance of Polish influence over early Belarusians. While significant in the
history of Poland and Belarus, in the grand scheme the Union was merely a marriage that
informally strengthened ties between two countries. Politically and economically, both Poland
and Lithuania as states continued to function rather autonomously. As time went on, both
internal and external factors prompted political actors to seek further integration and closer
cooperation. Finally, in 1569, the Union of Lublin solidified Lithuania and Poland in a political
and economic confederal state known as the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.5
From the time of the Krewa Union to the partitions of Poland in the 1700s, Poland‟s
influence and control over Belarusian culture was primarily exerted through religion and
language. When Jagiello converted to Catholicism upon marrying Jadwiga, the Grand Duchy
was effectively oriented towards the west.6 Since Catholicism was brought to the Grand Duchy
by the marriage to a Polish queen, Poland became a conduit between the Vatican and Vilnius;
“the introduction of Catholicism established a cultural link between Lithuania and Europe, and
created the potential for Polish influence.”7 Through willing and forced conversion, Belarusians
were brought into the Catholic faith and thus under Polish influence. Linguistically, Polish
surpassed all other tongues in the Commonwealth and became the language of politics and
business. Slavonic, the linguistic precursor to Belarusian, facilitated the rise of Polish in the
3

Savchenko, 3-5.
Ibidem, 25.
5
Timothy Snyder, Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569-1999 (New Haven: Yale
University, 2003), 29.
6
Jan Zaprudnik, Belarus at a Crossroads in History (Boulder: Westview, 1993), 21.
7
Snyder, 18.
4
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Commonwealth because of the two languages‟ common Slavic roots. However, this prestige was
short, and Slavonic was replaced by Polish as an official language in 1696.8 Not only was Polish
a more effective language to use for the purposes of upward mobility within the country, but also
Polish was the language through which philosophy, politics, and culture were being spread from
the west to the east.9
The religious and linguistic divergence eventually evolved into a socio-economic hierarchy.
The 15th and 16th centuries witnessed the rise of the Commonwealth gentry, or szlachta in Polish.
In order to advance in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, noblemen had to adopt Polish
language, customs, and culture. Polish was the language of the ruling class, while only the
peasantry and country-folk spoke Belarusian. This “Polonization” amongst the gentry was very
successful. Learning the Polish language became so ubiquitous that by the beginning of the
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Polish was the de facto lingua franca of the Grand Duchy‟s
elite; this trend was fashionable amongst Belarusian upper-class until World War I.10 This meant
that ethnic Belarusians aspiring to be a part of the national elite became, be it voluntarily or
reluctantly, Polish. In Minsk, the cultural hearth of Belarus, Poles made up 95% of the gentry.11
This adoption of Polish culture by Belarusians was a particularly endemic phenomenon at the
time. At a time when other nationalities in Europe were promoting and cultivating their
indigenous languages and cultures, Belarusian high society was taking on one foreign culture in
lieu of another. Throughout all the publications reviewed for this thesis, the lack of national
consciousness amongst Belarusians, even compared to their Commonwealth compatriots,
Ukrainians and Lithuanians, is widely agreed upon. While Polish language and culture enjoyed a
period of dominance in this region at the time, throughout the rest of the continent the tide was
turning against Poland. After several costly wars, Poland was dismantled in a series of partitions
amongst Russia, Prussia, and Austria; by the beginning of the nineteenth century the state of
Poland was no more. Lying east of the border, the region we know today as Belarus was entirely
enveloped by the Russian Empire.12

8

Zaprudnik, Historical Dictionary of Belarus, 38.
Snyder, 20.
10
Ibidem, 18-9, 55.
11
Savchenko, 38.
12
Zaprudnik, Belarus at a Crossroads, 40.
9
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II.

Legacies of Polish dominion during Russian rule in Belarus

By the time of the partitions, a sizeable percentage of the peasant population of the former
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was ethnic Belarusian.13 Upper-class Belarusians were, at
least linguistically and culturally, Polish, and the Belarusian peasantry adhered to a variation of
Catholicism called Uniate that was created as an extension of Polish power.14 Like Polonization,
the Russian Empire‟s newly acquired territory underwent Russification. Russia was determined
to fully and effectively acculturate these lands that, according to their historical narrative, were
theirs from the beginning.15 For Belarus, this meant quelling the influence of the Polish gentry.
However, since the definition for being “Polish” was based on language and religion as much as
anything else, the Polish-speaking Belarusian elite and Belarusian Catholics were persecuted
during this time.16 Simultaneously, Russification was intent to extinguish an emerging
Belarusian national identity. Symptomatic of the Enlightenment going on in Europe, small
groups of Belarusians were struggling to assert “Belarusian” as a distinct and legitimate identity.
From the top-down, the Russian Empire tried to squash Belarusian national identity through such
measures as a ban on printing the Belarusian language in 1866.17 The policies of Russia aside,
even within the Belarusian community aspirations for national development were complicated by
a history inexorably linked to Poland.
Looking for a historical precedent for independence, Belarusian nationalists threw around
notions of restoring the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Their affinity for the Grand Duchy was
primarily due to the elevated status of Belarusian (or more aptly, Slavonic) in the higher political
echelon. However, proving this was difficult. Due to the Polonization of the Grand Duchy‟s
political and cultural life, anything considered to be Belarusian about the Grand Duchy was long
lost; “the people who sought to revive the Grand Duchy of Lithuania under the new name
„Belarus‟ were themselves constrained by their identification with an early modern Polishness.”18
The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth experienced similar problems. Though the
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Commonwealth once provided a proud historical state identity amongst various ethnic groups,
any nostalgia was lost in the zeal and promise of modern nationalism.19
During the Belarusian national elites‟ struggle for legitimacy, their opinion of Poland began
to sour. As Belarus‟s national movement began to gain momentum, Polish influence was
perceived as more of a hindrance than a help. Though stewing for years, the distinctive split
amongst ethnic groups of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was highlighted by the
January Uprising in 1863. Poles exploited nationalist sympathies to enlist Belarusian peasants to
join them in a rebellion against the Russians. The Uprising failed, and many were disillusioned
with Poles‟ artificial support for Belarusian nationalism.20 Some activists continued to cooperate
with Poland, but many others branded Poland as a colonizer that retarded nation-building
amongst Belarusians and had oppressed Belarus for centuries.21 Solidarity amongst ethnic groups
of the former Commonwealth was gone, replaced with animosity and ethnocentrism.

III.

The 20th Century

Like many countries, Belarus was deeply affected by World War I. Being that it was located
between the German and Russian empires, Belarus was the frontline for fighting and much
bloodshed in 1915.22 Germans occupied large parts of Belarusian territory, including Minsk.
Germans supported some aspects of Belarusian nationalism whenever it was to their benefit. As
a result, segments of the Belarusian elite collaborated with the Germans: “Belarusian national
elites, since their emergence [was] devoid of political power, [they] found that a modicum of
influence could be attained from the occupation authority, which was prepared to be benevolent
to the extent that Belarusian nation-building was deemed useful to Germany‟s national
interests.”23
The economic and human losses of World War I were tremendous. Nevertheless, it was
during the last year of the war that the first Belarusian state emerged; “After signing the [Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk], the executive committee of the previously dispersed Belorussian congress…
proclaimed a Belorussian People‟s Republic on March 25.”24 While the Germans were slightly
19
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more inclined to support the advent of Belarusian nationalism than any other occupier, it was
only from a perspective that would suit their interests. Therefore, Germany neither recognized
this newly formed state nor facilitated in any way the actions of the BDR.25
The formation of an official state of Belarus is an event that is met with mixed feelings
amongst Belarusians and historians. While it was an impressive feat that Belarus was declared a
distinct political entity that historically had no equivalent, the politicking to make this dream of a
Belarusian state a reality was largely happening at the highest political tier; the move to
statehood had minor popular support emanating from the common Belarusian.26 Regardless, the
Belarusian Democratic Republic was short-lived. No sooner was Belarus free from the Russian
Empire is was once again incorporated into Russian dominion, only this time under the banner of
the Soviet Union; “On December 20th, 1918, the sixth regional conference of the Russian
Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) in Smolensk converted into the First Congress of the
Communist Party of Belarus and, on January 1, 1919, proclaimed the erection of the Belarusian
Soviet Socialist Republic [BSSR].”27
By 1919, Belarus was once again turned into a battlefield. In the Polish-Soviet War, the
Soviet Union rolled over Belarus towards Warsaw. Desperate for allies, Poles sought the support
of Lithuanians and Ukrainians in the war against the Bolsheviks; Belarusians weren‟t engaged in
the fight against the Russians to the extent of other eastern ethnic groups because their national
character was significantly weaker than the others. 28 Eventually the Poles pushed the Red Army
back into the Soviet Union; in the Treaty of Riga that settled the war in 1921, territory containing
Belarusians was divided between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Belarusian Soviet Republic
continued to exist albeit with a small fraction of the world‟s Belarusians living in it.29
At this point, the experience of Belarusians differed depending on whether they lived in
Poland or if they lived in Soviet Belarus. In Poland, life became particularly hard for Belarusians
as they and other minorities were systematically persecuted and oppressed.30 Because of their
legacy of peasantry, the ethnically Belarusian territory under control of Poland after the Treaty of
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Riga was poor, underdeveloped, and economically stagnant.31 Due to pressure from world
powers at the end of World War I, Poland reluctantly agreed to a law respecting national
minorities. However, very rarely did the government observe it:32
“By 1924 Polish authorities felt ready to start pressure on the „Eastern Provinces,‟ trying to
make them linguistically Polish by closing non-Polish schools, banning non-Polish
publications, and settling Polish colonizers. Speeches by the [Belarusian] and Ukrainian
deputies… catalog a long litany of complaints about abuses and atrocities at the hands of the
authorities at all levels.”33
The situation only got worse as Poland took a turn toward authoritarian rule. By the late
1920s Poland grew disenchanted with its experiment in parliamentary democracy.34 Tensions
continued to mount between left and right factions within the state. After several attempts at
reconciliation, the chief military officer during the Polish-Soviet War and one of the architects of
the revived Polish state, Marshal Jósef Piłsudski, staged a coup and attacked the sitting
government on May 14, 1926.35 Initially, Belarusian political activists were supportive of the
coup as they certainly did not have any sympathizers in the right-wing regime. Therefore, they
backed Piłsudski but with an air of caution.36 Piłsudski was a federalist, so he envisioned a
Poland ruled by Poles but containing semiautonomous communities inhabited by the country‟s
various ethnic groups. His support for national minorities masked his ulterior motive to win over
the hearts of ethnic minorities in the eastern borderlands so they would favor Poland over Russia.
Once again though, nationalism was encouraged amongst Ukrainians and Lithuanians, not
Belarusians. 37 While Piłsudski was supportive of some aspects of Belarusian cultural
development under federalism, he (along with most other Poles) was an expansionist at heart; for
them, the eastern territory rightfully belonged to Poland. 38 Officially, Belarusians were
categorized as a “nonhistorical” ethnic group that had no claim to statehood.39 Any concessions
towards Belarusians were lost in a frenzy of nationalistic politicians who were determined to
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construct an ethnically homogenous Polish state. Military concerns frequently shaped the
government‟s positions on minorities; at the time some feared that excessive rights and
autonomy granted to minorities encouraged separatist ideas that would in turn weaken Poland
strategically.40 Unfortunately, Piłsudski and his regime only made life harder for ethnic
minorities in Poland. Once again, the problems at hand were language and, even more so,
religion. The new constitution, approved in 1934, made it easier to restrict civil liberties and
discriminate against faiths other than Catholicism.41 Many other social and cultural institutions
were closed down for being affiliated with subversive groups or foreign enemies. As Belarusians
were politically subdued, the Polish government also looked to disband non-Catholic
denominations; Orthodox Belarusians were faced with the prospect of deportation if they did not
convert to Catholicism.42
Because of the level of injustice against Belarusians in Poland, many ethnic Belarusians
believed the situation was much better on the other side of the border in Soviet Belarus. A lack
of information disseminating from the BSSR was probably to blame, but many saw the Soviets
as nurturing Belarusian nationalism.43 Indeed, a certain level of progress was achieved, primarily
because of the Soviet Union‟s two-faced approach to nationalism. Moscow permitted some
semblance of national development so long as it stayed in line with party politics. For instance,
schools in the BSSR taught in Belarusian, and literacy rates improved amongst the populace.44
However, in the BSSR it was not that Belarusian was promoted so much, but that Polish was
downgraded. As the Polish-speaking gentry became the bourgeois enemy in the Soviet class
warfare, the opportunity emerged for Belarusians to enter the ranks of national elite that for so
long were occupied by Poles.45 Furthermore, in schools Poles were characterized as nefarious,
and aspects of Polish culture (mostly, language and Catholicism) were severely restricted or
banned.46
Whatever small achievements that were made in Belarus under the Soviet Union were
overshadowed by the terror and maltreatment that prevailed. In Soviet Belarus, many aspects
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Belarusian cultural development were ruthlessly oppressed.47 The Belarusian Soviet Socialist
Republic continued to exist as a state, but it was far from independent. Moscow unabashedly
directed its foreign policy and appointed government leaders. Belarus did not escape the
ethnocide and politically-motivated killings that were common themes in the new Soviet
republics at this time. Members of the national intelligentsia, writers, scientists, clergy, and
activists were arrested and executed en masse throughout the 1930s; others fled or committed
suicide. In Kurapaty, a forest outside of Minsk, more than 100,000 Belarusians were
systematically killed over four years before and after the start of World War II.48 The Belarusian
experience was hard in the interwar Polish Republic. However, nothing happening in Poland
could compare to the mass murder and violence that occurred just over the border. The 1930s
were a grim decade for the Belarusian people, and with World War II looming in the distance,
the worst was yet to come.
Poland and Belarus suffered terribly during World War II. Some ethnic minorities in interwar
Poland welcomed the invasion of the USSR in 1939 because they were still under the delusion
that the Soviets would be better than Poles; Belarusians in particular favored the Soviets because
of their affinity for communism. In the absence of law and order immediately following the
Soviet invasion of Poland, there were a number of documented attacks between Poles and
Belarusians. However, evidence suggests that these were sporadic and predominantly based on
avenging personal grudges rather than a massive uprising against Poles.49 Despite the hostility
between Poles and Belarusians, their respective experiences in World War II were rather similar
in terms of incalculable destruction and unimaginable level of death. Both countries lost huge
percentages of their population, roughly 16% in Poland and around 20% in Belarus.50 The Jewish
populations of each country, the largest in Europe, were almost completely exterminated. Their
capital cities, Warsaw in Poland and Minsk in Belarus, were leveled. Belarus and Poland were
also home to many of the most notorious death camps where millions of Europeans perished
because of starvation, disease, shootings, and gas. Partisan activity was very high in Poland and
especially in Belarus, where the physical geography of thick forests and treacherous marshes was
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ideal for hiding. While these groups were often very scattered, unorganized, and fighting for
differing causes, they added an additional layer of terror that the Belarusian and Polish people
had to endure. The variety of suffering was great, and both Poland and Belarus suffered
tremendously.
At the end of World War II the border between Poland and Belarus was once again redrawn.
Initially further to the east, the new boundary was along the “Curzon line” that delineated Poland
and Belarus before the Russo-Polish War. The symbolism of the border between the two
countries being named by a foreign official (in this case a British foreign minister) is worth
noting. With territorial restructuring came resettlement. The majority of the migration was
headed westward out of Belarus and into Poland. Some of these people, particularly ethnic Poles
and Catholic Belarusians, were escaping the Soviets. Many others were deported by force in
order to make the ethnic profile of the region predominantly Belarusian:51 “By 1947, when the
crest of the exodus had passed, a total of 120,000 Poles, 85,000 Jews, and 469,000 Belarusans
had resettled from Belarusan territories to the west of the Curzon line.”52 The Polish government
tried to remove hundreds of thousands of Belarusians from Polish territory, but it was not
successful.
For the remainder of the 20th century until the collapse of the Soviet Union, PolishBelarusian relations came to a standstill. The highly centralized nature of the USSR meant that
contact between Soviet republics and other countries happened through Moscow. For Belarus,
the rule of the Soviet Union was accompanied by heavy denationalization and Sovietization
efforts. Maintaining the narrative that dated back to the Bolsheviks, Soviet authorities fudged
history in order to sever Belarus‟s historical ties with Poland and emphasize Belarus as a part of
Russia. Politically, relations between these two countries were extremely difficult given the
hegemony of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this did not mean that Poles completely forgot
about the plight of Belarusians. Throughout the Cold War, Polish intellectuals and political
activists advocated for reconciliation with Poland‟s eastern neighbors and expressed a sincere
sense of solidarity for national independence for the countries of Belarus, Ukraine, and
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Lithuania. 53 With the demise of Communism in the 1980s and 1990s, relations between Poland
and Belarus entered a new chapter.

IV.

Conclusions

The shared history of Poland and Belarus goes back hundreds of years. The Grand Duchy of
Lithuania and, later, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth gradually introduced Polish language,
customs, political traditions, and religion into Belarusian society. As a result of this
acculturation, the upper class of Belarus was effectively dominated by its ties to Poland from the
middle ages to the 20th century. The modern historical relationship was characterized by Poland
and Russia each vying for influence and control of the country, neither seeing Belarus as a nation
fit for a state. 54 Enmity between Poles and Belarusians was palpable during the interwar years
when Polish statehood resulted in the oppression of minorities. Warsaw‟s approach to
Belarusians and all national minorities within Poland was a leading cause for the demise of a
truly democratic Polish Republic.55 Following World War II, diplomatic relations between
Poland and Belarus were dominated by the Soviet Union. For Belarus, the process of
Sovietization that was paused because of the Second World War resumed, and the country
endured decades more of denationalization.56
There is a general consensus amongst scholars and political scientists that Belarus‟s
persistent existence in the borderlands of powerful nations has hampered the democratic
consolidation of the country. Furthermore, the absence of (non-Polish) national elites, the
relative economic success under the Soviet Union, and the legacy of passivity amongst the
Belarusian populace have all contributed to making Belarus the last dictatorship in Europe. For
Belarusians, there was always someone calling the shots, be it a Pole, a Russian, or now,
President Lukashenko.
For much of history, a connection with Poland has resulted in more exposure to
developments going on in Western Europe. In the most recent memory of modern-day
Belarusians and their descendents, Poland‟s behavior in western Belarus lingers. Though this is a
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factor Poland will have to overcome in forging strong relations with Belarus today, the extent to
which history will affect the decision-making process (in a democratic Belarus) is uncertain;
previous regional dynamics could have an impact on several different directions in terms of
future cooperation and assistance. For instance, the antagonistic relationship and legacy of
oppression in the twentieth century might lead one to believe that Poland would be the last
country Belarus would see as a trustworthy partner. However, if this is the case, then why would
Belarus sustain its strong links to Russia, a country whose presence in the country was more
recent and arguably more detrimental?
The history of Poland and Belarus has run a relatively parallel course for centuries. However,
as will be further developed in the next chapter, the collapse of Communism and the fall of the
USSR led to a divergence in Polish and Belarusian history. Political activism in Poland was one
of the most important factors in bringing down Communism in Eastern Europe. As a result,
Poland actively oriented its policy westward, embracing a free market economy and joining
NATO and the EU. Belarus, on the other hand, languished and held onto many remnants of its
Soviet past. With the world system changing so drastically over twenty years, what role will
Poland play in the future of Belarus?
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CHAPTER 2: EXPORTING EXPERIENCE
Polish-Belarusian Relations since the Collapse of Communism

Building upon the history between the two countries, this chapter will review Poland‟s
relationship with Belarus from 1991 to the present. Initially, diplomatic relations between the
two countries after independence were rather positive and gave many a reason for optimism.
However, the situation deteriorated around 1994 when Belarus‟s current leader, Aleksandr
Lukashenko, was elected. While Poland continued to strengthen ties to Europe, striving for a
liberal western-style democracy, Lukashenko‟s policies maintained Belarus‟s strong bond to
Russia as well as fortified his power in a Soviet-style manner. With Poland‟s accession to EuroAtlantic institutions, the divide between the two countries has only grown deeper. Reflecting the
interwar years, the minority issue has frequently been a point of contention between the two
countries. Despite the quarrels taking place between Minsk and Warsaw, Belarus is still a
priority country for Polish assistance and in the foreign policy considerations of the Polish
government. The last portion of this chapter will explore various methods by which Poland is
pursuing its interests in the country, outside of interacting with Lukashenko, via independent
media outlets, non-governmental organizations, and other instruments of assistance.

I.

The Immediate Post-Soviet Cooperation

As the USSR began to disintegrate, Poland was one of the states on the forefront in
encouraging Soviet republics to pursue independence. During this period, Poland had to address
the dramatic changes occurring in the Soviet Union delicately, as the outcome was unclear.
Therefore, Poland‟s political approach to the individual republics of the Soviet Union was
characterized as a “two-track” policy. Poland carefully initiated bilateral relations with the
neighboring Soviet states, Lithuania, Belarus, and Ukraine, without renouncing the existing
agreements and dialogue with the Soviet Union.1
In Belarus, Poland‟s first attempt at bilateral relations was unsuccessful. In 1990, a
diplomatic mission from Warsaw was sent to Minsk to begin what many hoped to be the first
step in a new stage of Polish-Belarusian relations, one marked with mutually beneficial political,
1
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economic, and social development. However, issues surrounding minority populations in both
countries as well as the border between Poland and Belarus proved to be irreconcilable and
negotiations were brought to a standstill.2 Based on my research, this first failure at establishing
relations between the two countries was due to two primary factors working against Poland in
Belarus. First of all, unlike other republics at the time that were eager to break any and all
political ties to the Soviet Union, Belarus was relatively passive about gaining independence.
Belarusian officials were timid about stepping out on their own and instead continued to look to
Moscow for guidance. The perceived unwillingness for Belarusian politicians to disavow
themselves from the Soviet Union complicated the diplomatic interaction between Poland and
Belarus and aggravated Polish officials. In addition, Poland‟s maltreatment of ethnic Belarusians
during the interwar years was another obstacle to overcome. The national memory of Belarus
negatively stereotyped Poles as aggressors from their behavior in western Belarus. This was
evident when Krzysztof Skubiszewski, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1989 to 1993,
visited Minsk for the first time and was met with protesters decrying Poland for injustices against
Belarusians during the time of the Second Republic.3
Due to this first disappointment in 1990, Poland was left with little time to construct stable
diplomatic relations with Belarus prior to its independence. However, the variables that would
lead to the demise of the USSR were already set in motion. Before long, the Soviet Union folded,
and on September 3, 1991, Poland recognized Belarus as an independent and sovereign state.4
Despite the initial setback, the next couple of years were marked with a number of positive gains
in cooperation between the neighboring countries. Not long after independence, Belarus
concluded the Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Cooperation as well as an
economic agreement with Poland. Because of this as well as Poland‟s more fluid access to the
Euro market, trade between Belarus and Poland increased by 20 percent.5 To facilitate
international trade, Poland permitted the export of Belarusian products out of the Polish port city
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of Gdynia.6 Trade between Poland and Belarus was approximately 306 million USD in 1992,
making Poland Belarus‟s primary non-CIS trading partner in the world.7 Within the third sector,
the early 90s was a golden age of Belarusian civil society. NGOs, associations, and clubs
appeared by the thousands as Belarus awoke from decades of Soviet civil dormancy. Many
Belarusians NGOs and non-profits looked to Poland as a role model, since its civil society was
one of the most developed in Central and Eastern Europe.8
At the local level, the “bazaar” culture between Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine also flourished.
With the fall of the Soviet Union and the relaxed borders, Belarusians and others from
neighboring states would traverse the borders daily selling their products to consumers in Poland,
as Poles were generally on better economic footing than their Ukrainian or Belarusian
counterparts. It is difficult to attach a concrete value to this informal level of trade but the
economic benefits of it were evident. Trans-border trade provided many individuals with capital
they had never had before. This capital was invested into businesses and was also spent in the
area, benefitting others who were not directly participating in the bazaar culture. From this
increase in revenue and entrepreneurship emerged a new middle-class on both sides of the
border. These rudimentary trade networks evolved into the more formal transnational trade hubs,
as many wholesale shops and firms were established along the border. This daily interaction was
also a step in creating positive bonds and friendships between Poles and their eastern neighbors.
Why did this partnership decline? Poland‟s efforts in not just Belarus but Eastern Europe in
general slowed down considerably after 1993 for a number of reasons. Firstly, the global powers
at the time were intent to engage the Russian Federation and establish friendly relations with
Boris Yeltsin to the extent that they looked the other way when it came to Russia‟s continued
influence in Eastern Europe. Poland, eager to prove that it was more western than eastern, sided
with the United States and others and backed off from its activity in the former USSR.9 In
Belarus specifically, the 1994 election of Aleksandr Lukashenko, a roguish character with
staunchly pro-Russian views, made Poland reconsider its support for the Belarusian government.
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Despite the promise of the early 90s, the progress Poland was making in Belarus fallowed and
relations between the two countries subsided.

II.

The Rise of Lukashenko and the decline of progress in Poland-Belarus relations

In any movement towards democratic consolidation, political scientists characterize countries
as being “transition winners” and “transition losers,” based on their success in achieving the
tenants of a modern democracy (market economy, political pluralism, flourishing civil society,
etc). In the wave of democracy that swept over the former Soviet Union, Central European states
and the Baltic countries are proclaimed to be transition winners, while other countries in Eastern
Europe, the Caucasus region, and Central Asia are deemed transition losers. In this dichotomy,
Belarus falls into the latter category.
Despite the overall harshness of Soviet rule, Belarus was one of the better fairing and more
developed of the Soviet republics.10 However, the transition to democracy was arduous, and
many Belarusians found the living conditions to be considerably worse in their newly
independent state than as a Soviet republic. Inflation was outrageously high, product shortages
were commonplace, and corruption was rampant.11 Not unlike many other former Soviet states at
the time, the Belarusian leadership changed very little. What was supposed to be a new
government was instead a revamped nomenklatura with many of the same political figures
holding the same positions (and profiting considerably under the so-called “market economy”),
only this time under the guise of democracy rather than socialist dictatorship.12 The exception to
this rule was Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Stanislaŭ Shushkevich, a physics professor and
prominent figure in the politically-active and upwardly mobile Belarusian elite. However, his
term was largely ineffective because Prime Minister Viacheslaŭ Kebich, a notorious lackey for
Moscow during the Soviet era, wielded most of the power.13 The Belarusian electorate blamed
the slow and difficult period of transition on the ineptitude of the crooked powers that be, and in
the 1994 election they desired a leader who was a departure of the current regime, a paladin of
the transition losers.
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Aleksandr Lukashenko was just that leader. A former KGB officer, teacher, and collective
farms chairman, Lukashenko effectively capitalized on his position of being affiliated neither
with the Belarusian intelligentsia nor Shushkevich‟s government. Rhetorically gifted and
physically impressive, Lukashenko‟s maverick persona epitomized the everyman who would
fight for the masses against a corrupt, illiberal regime. Lukashenko‟s campaign strategy tactfully
blended populist resentment towards the sitting government while simultaneously evoking
nostalgia for life as a part of the Soviet Union. In fact, while many countries in the region were
trying vehemently to distance themselves from Russia, Lukashenko‟s platform was based on
maintaining and strengthening Belarus‟s relationship with its neighbor to the east.14
When Lukashenko came to power, he did exactly this. For the rest of the 1990s
Lukashenko‟s unabashedly pro-Russia policies pursued integration with Russia economically,
politically, and militarily. In addition to the 1992 Free Trade Agreement that was concluded prior
to his presidency, Lukashenko immediately started negotiating with Yeltsin such measures as a
shared currency, a customs union, and cooperation on defense and border patrol. In addition,
through a number of referenda Lukashenko reintroduced Soviet-era symbols along with Russian
language and culture. In 1999, the Russian Duma gave overwhelming support to a treaty that
would merge the two countries into a confederate state. In essence, after not even a decade of
independence, the re-integration of Belarus into Russia became a question of not “if” but
“when.”15
This fixation on Russia prompted Poland to tread lightly in continued cooperation with the
Lukashenko regime. With the memory of the Soviet Union still fresh, Poland was suspicious of
Russia attempting to establish a network of subservient states on the western borderlands which
had the potential to be a threat to Poland‟s independence.16 Likewise, Lukashenko (and Yelstin)
saw Poland‟s new membership in NATO as an incursion of western military influence into
Eastern Europe. Poland was not only cautious of Lukashenko‟s affinity for Russia in his foreign
policy, but also his domestic authoritarian leadership style. A referendum pushed through in
1996 abolished the existing constitution and consolidated power in the executive, as well as
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loaded the national government with rubber stamps for Lukashenko. Political opposition was
subordinated, private enterprise was quelled, and civil society was hollowed.17
The flagrantly undemocratic conduct of Lukashenko was met with acute condemnation by
the European Community. From the very beginning, Poland was one of the most outspoken
critics of the Lukashenko regime, and called attention internationally to Belarus‟s regression into
authoritarianism. Tensions peaked in the summer of 1998 when Belarusian authorities evicted
Western diplomats from their residences in the Drozdy district of Minsk. In response to the
blatant disregard for the Vienna Convention and international protocol, the European
Community banned Lukashenko and many members of his government from entering Member
States‟ territory. Poland, however, did not recognize the ban extending to Poland. Foreign
Minister Bronisław Geremek pointed out that Poland has a unique position in relations to Belarus
compared to other European states (read: a border country containing a Polish national minority);
ostracizing the Belarusian government would only encourage Lukashenko‟s hard-line rule and
could have detrimental effects on the population of Belarus and particularly Belarusian Poles.
This decision was met with reserved acquiescence by Brussels, and satisfaction by Belarusian
authorities.18
In this author‟s opinion, Poland‟s strategy towards Belarus at this period was ill-conceived.
As mentioned, Poland was a persistent advocate in Europe for the importance of nurturing
democratic principles in Belarus. Yet when the European Community finally took concrete
action against Lukashenko, Poland protested. Poland‟s reasons for doing so were supposedly on
behalf of the struggling opposition movement in Belarus, but even factions within the opposition
wanted Poland to be firmer with Lukashenko. Polish officials also cited the Polish minority in
Belarus as a reason not to break off communication with Belarus. However, it was exactly
because of the Polish minority in Belarus that Poland should have been the most enthusiastic at
weakening Lukashenko before he became entrenched in power. Moreover, at the time of the
Drozdy affair, Poland was chairing the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE). The clout that came with this position meant that Poland‟s opinion would have carried
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considerable weight within the international community. Like 1993, 1998 was another year of
lost opportunity for fortifying Belarus‟s democracy.
Even though 1998 was a failed year in the democratization, it marked an important shift in
Poland‟s relationship with Belarus. Shortly thereafter Poland acceded to NATO (1999) and the
European Union (2004). This pro-western direction exacerbated the discordance between Poland
and Belarus. In terms of bilateral relations, as Lukashenko proved himself to be more
incorrigible and headstrong, Poland recognized that any progress through state-to-state relations
was rather unlikely. Instead, Poland began to channel its efforts into grassroots support for the
Belarusian population, particularly independent media and non-governmental organizations.
From then on, empowering civil society and reaching out to the Belarusian population was the
objective of Poland‟s Belarus policy. As for the relationship between Lukashenko and the Polish
government, it followed a rather predictable waltz: Lukashenko became more and more
dictatorial, and Poland would censure him for his conduct but no action would come of it. This
war of words never amounted to much action on either side. However, tensions boiled over in
2005 when Lukashenko‟s iron fist came down on the Polish minority in Belarus.

III.

Issues of the Polish Minority in Belarus

As stated before, Poland and Belarus both house minority populations of the other in their
territory. In Belarus, roughly 4 percent of the population is ethnically Polish, and in Poland 0.1
percent of the population is Belarusian.19 The status of these minority populations has frequently
been critical to relations between Belarus and Poland. Particularly in the past few years,
harassment by Belarusian authorities of Polish minority organizations has been instrumental in
shaping Polish foreign policy towards Belarus and Lukashenko.
The most notorious crisis involved one of the more active ethnic Polish organizations in
Belarus, Związek Polaków na Białorusi (ZPB) or the Union of Poles in Belarus. ZPB has been
around since the late 1980s and strives to represent Polish interests in Belarus; “The [ZPB‟s]
main thrust is to conserve Polish culture and promote Polish education in Belarus.”20 Despite the
troubled recent history of Polish-Belarusian relations, ZPB operated cogently by complying with
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Belarusian authorities. However, this changed in 2005 when the organization held an election for
president and the preferred candidate of the Belarusian government, Tadeusz Kruchkowski, lost
to Andżelika Borys. Belarusian authorities intervened and refused to recognize the election as
valid. Members of ZPB countered that Belarusian authorities had tampered with the election, and
this violated both Belarusian law as well as the Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and
Friendly Cooperation between Poland and Belarus.21 Incensed, Belarusian authorities detained
Borys along with many of her supporters. The Polish government was enraged by this act of
injustice and no longer recognized the Belarusian-sanctioned ZPB. Lukashenko, convinced that
Poland and other foreign elements were collaborating with minorities to overthrow him, arrested
Polish journalists and harassed Borys and her constituents.22 Poland and Belarus expelled a
number of diplomats from their respective countries, and Poland threatened to withdraw its
embassy.23
In 2010, another dispute arose between the Polish minority and the Belarusian government.
Teresa Sobol, leader of the Polish House in the town of Ivanets, west of Minsk, was active in the
Polish community there and worked with Borys‟s “unofficial” ZPB. That year, Sobol was
accused of misappropriation of funds and taken to court. Undeterred by this clear attempt at
intimidation by the government, Sobol continued to work as the head of the Polish House. The
Belarusian government called for the election of a new leader. Sobol was re-elected, not to the
liking of the Belarusian government; “within a week of Sobol‟s electoral victory, the Polish
House was cordoned off with an official court seal… Teresa Sobol was expelled from the
organization and was restricted from entering the Polish House.”24 This local dispute soon grew
to a transnational conflict. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs quickly condemned Belarus‟s
oppression of the Polish minority. Poland threatened Lukashenko with not only retribution from
Poland but also European institutions.
Lukashenko‟s response to the Ivanets conflict changed depending on whom he was
addressing. Playing a game of semantics, Lukashenko denied there was even an issue of the
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Polish minority in Belarus as the concept of a “national minority” didn‟t exist in Belarus.25
However, when Lukashenko met Foreign Minister Sikorski in Ukraine a few months after the
dispute, the two agreed to establish a bipartisan committee to review the legal action taken
against Borys and her supporters. This initiative lost momentum after the death of Polish Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Andrzej Kremer, in the Smolensk plane crash.26 In the end,
Lukashenko backed off from open persecution of the Polish minority, at least enough to assuage
the Polish government.27 His placatory performance was intended to convince the European
Union he was willing to play by its rules. The Union was starting to re-engage Belarus, and since
there was a lot of money riding on the EU‟s seal of approval, Lukashenko couldn‟t afford the bad
publicity. The 2010 presidential election, however, provided Lukashenko with enough bad
publicity for years to come.

IV.

The 2010 Belarusian Presidential “Elections”

The outcome of the 2010 elections in Belarus was going to be crucial for the next step in
Belarus‟s external relationship with Poland, the EU, and others. Whether or not the elections
were deemed free and fair by international standards was paramount. In an interview with the
Polish newspaper Rzeczpospolita, Lukashenko balked at the ultimata delivered to him from
abroad. He noted, with an air of condescension, that elections in Belarus would be fair like they
always have been. At the same time, he stated confidently, “I will stay on as long as I want.”28
The presidential elections were held on December 19, but the conduct and outcome were
anything but legitimate. Including Lukashenko, there were ten candidates on the ballot. From the
opposition, the men who had the most support were Uladzimir Nyaklayeu from the Speak the
Truth Campaign (16%) and Andrey Sannikau from the For a European Belarus party (10%).
Lukashenko was predicted to achieve between 30-40 percent of the popular vote. While to some
25
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this might be a surprisingly high number for an autocrat, it was half the number of Lukashenko‟s
“official” estimate, and would not give the president the 50% threshold he needed to win without
holding a run-off election. On the night of the election, the opposition candidates planned a
demonstration on October Square in Minsk as a display of solidarity. To deter the event, the
Belarusian government converted October Square into a skating rink and warned that anyone
present for anything other than skating would be subject to arrest.29 The demonstration took
place that evening, but due to the hindrances put in place by government authorities it was
decided to move it to Independence Square, home of the parliament building and the Central
Electoral Committee.
At this point, the situation began to unravel. Riot police surged onto the crowds at
Independence Square, arresting hundreds of protesters and beating thousands more. Nyaklayeu
did not even make it to the first demonstration at October Square; while en route he was stopped
by traffic police and beaten so severely he had to be taken to the hospital. While at the hospital
security forces abducted him and no one, not even his wife, heard from him for more than a
week. 30 Sannikau also sustained serious injuries and was imprisoned with seven other opposition
candidates, all facing prosecution. Adding to this orgy of repression, the leader of the Union
Civic Party, Anatol Lyabedzka, was detained and the offices of several organizations and
businesses such as European Radio for Belarus were raided. 31 In the end, the orchestrator of this
violence, Aleksandr Lukashenko, was declared the winner of the election with a laughable 80%
of the popular vote. 32
In the wake of the election, there was a litany of condemnations coming in from around the
world. Scornfully, the European Union was prepared to swiftly put in place a new round of
sanctions. Yet again Poland disagreed with the EU‟s plan of action. While Sikorski stated
publicly that forms of assistance such as loans from the EU, IMF, the World Bank, and others
should terminate, he emphasized the detrimental effects of ostracizing Belarus. According to
Sikorski, totally isolating Belarus from the international community would help neither Poland‟s
interest nor the interests of those residing in Belarus. Therefore, any punishment towards Belarus
should involve targeting the Lukashenko administration and those entities which are supporting
29
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his dictatorship while trying to spare the effects from harming the Belarusian population. It is
because of this that Poland decided not to abandon current projects with Belarus, such as a
border traffic agreement that would ease interstate migration for citizens within the border zones
of the two countries.33
Poland continues its quasi-relationship with the Belarusian people by circumventing the
government. In 2011 the Polish government waived visa fees for Belarusians, provided aid and
asylum to victims of Lukashenko‟s harsh rule, and promised to double the allotted assistance to
Belarusian groups supporting civil society.34 In February, the Polish government and others
raised €87 million to help Belarusian independent media and civil society.35 The 2010 election
once again proved that dialogue with Lukashenko is futile, but that his impropriety and tyranny
would not bring down the entire country. Poland‟s aid to Belarus is the highest it has ever been,
and it is channeled to organizations and individuals that are fighting for a free and democratic
Belarusian state.

V.

Polish Foreign Aid to Belarus

A recipient of aid from western powers during its own transition, Poland is now “paying it
forward” to less-fortunate countries, especially in Eastern Europe. Financial support from abroad
was critical to Poland‟s transition to a free-market democracy in the 1990s.36 In Eastern Europe,
assistance has both a practical and ethical role. A prosperous and economically viable Belarus
and Ukraine would provide stability for the entire region, something clearly in Poland‟s national
interest. On a more altruistic level, Poland has expressed solidarity with its eastern neighbors,
and feels a sense of obligation to help them in their transition. By donating and supporting
countries‟ struggle for democracy and development, the country is more credible as a legitimate
promoter of democratic principles in the world.
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As a result of intense restructuring, Poland since 2004 operates through the framework of
development co-operation. That is, Poland works with developing countries around the globe in
order to create successful and self-sustaining development in areas where it is most needed.
Instituting development co-operation was important for Poland to meet EU standards as well as
to ensure the entire process was regulated, transparent, and above all, effective; “[Poland] is also
responsible for the processes and actions aimed at socio-economic development and the growth
of global prosperity, and that development co-operation should constitute an integral part of
Polish foreign policy.”37 Within the program of development co-operation, the money is
disseminated via bilateral or multilateral networks. The European Community Budget, European
Development Fund, OSCE, United Nations, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank are
all multilateral aid entities in which Poland participates.38 Because of Poland‟s obligation to
contribute to European Union funds, the multilateral aid contribution is greater than bilateral aid.
However, bilateral aid is a more accurate indicator of what the Polish government believes are
places worthy of its concern, as the countries who receive bilateral aid are considered to be
priority states from the perspective of Polish foreign policy. Polish bilateral foreign aid is
concentrated in the categories of technical assistance, financial assistance, food aid, humanitarian
aid, and volunteerism. In 2011, the primary objectives for Polish development co-operation were
good governance, migrations and border management, rural and agricultural development, and
small and medium enterprises (SMEs).39
Belarus is consistently one of the largest recipient countries for Polish bilateral aid. For years
Belarus has been a preeminent country for Poland. Though the themes may differ from year to
year, Poland‟s primary objectives in support for Belarus have been and continue to be facilitating
the construction of civil society in Eastern Europe and introducing European standards and
values to the country.40 In light of the 2010 election Sikorski promised to increase aid to Belarus
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by approximately PLN 10 million.41 2011 would be the highest amount of aid ever given to
Belarus, with approximately PLN 42 million planned for the fiscal year.42
The goal of Polish aid to Belarus in 2011 is directed towards creating and strengthening civil
society.43 Where is the money going? Lukashenko has demonstrated he will respect neither
democratic principles nor the civil liberties of his people; aid does not go to the government as
that would support an illiberal regime. Therefore, the Polish government has concluded that the
more effective way to empower the Belarusian citizenry is by assisting and collaborating with
NGOS, independent media services, and other institutions; “by partnering with… Belarusians,
Polish NGOs assist rather than act. They share responsibilities and are part of the decisionmaking process about project implementation.”44
Polish bilateral aid is given to a variety of NGOs and other organizations. In April 2011 the
Polish MFA gave more than PLN 5 million to a number of organizations through the special
competition held known as “Support for Belarusian Society 2011.” 45 These grants covered such
themes as civil society, independent media, entrepreneurship, youth and exchanges, education,
human rights, and infrastructure. Another competition, “Development Aid 2011”, gave an
additional nine NGOs approximately PLN 2 million.46
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The graph above shows the amount of money devoted to Belarus since 2006. Money under
the Polish Aid Programme represents the money given to independent media, NGOs, and
local administrative bodies. Official Development Assistance is defined by the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC). In
addition to the funding provided by the Polish Aid Programme, this amount includes bilateral
aid and loans. To be considered a loan, at least 25 percent of the total sum of the loan is in
the form of a donation. ODA also takes into account money given to all ministries, not just the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At the time of writing this thesis, the Polish MFA published an
online brochure on development co-operation in 2012. PLN 23.5 million was allotted to
Belarus and supporting the priority areas of independent media and civil society and aiding
“disadvantaged” society.
For 2009-10, 1 PLN ≈ 3 USD
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VI.

Polish assistance to NGOs and other institutions

Non-governmental organizations, think tanks, and other “third sector” entities in Poland are
some of the most active in the world when it comes to Belarus. These organizations both conduct
research on Belarus and partner with organizations in Belarus with the intent of creating a
vibrant civil society and promoting democracy. Out of the 54 member organizations affiliated
with Grupa Zagranica, an association of Polish-based NGOs, over half of them specifically
mention Belarus as a target country for their operations.48 These types of organizations receive
millions in aid from the Polish government to fund their efforts.
While Polish bilateral aid is given to institutions that are carrying out a litany of projects
concerned with all facets of democratization of Belarus, independent media is overwhelmingly
the largest recipient of MFA assistance. When speaking of independent media for Belarus, there
are three main examples: Belsat TV, Radio Racja, and European Radio for Belarus. All three
receive funding from the Polish government, but Belsat TV receives by far the greatest share of
money. In 2010, out of the PLN 24 million that was set aside for Belarus, PLN 16 million went
to Belsat TV.49 Not only is Belsat TV the main benefactor of Polish governmental assistance, but
the Polish government is the primary financer of Belsat TV.50 The very existence of Belsat
would not be possible if it were not for the Polish government. Belsat TV was launched in 2007
as a joint initiative between the Polish MFA and Telewizja Polska, or Polish Public Television.
Based in Warsaw but broadcasting to Belarus and elsewhere, Belsat TV was the first television
station to broadcast exclusively in the Belarusian language and continues to be the only source of
independent and unbiased source of news for Belarus on TV. Belsat TV is watched by
approximately 10 percent of the population of Belarus, and almost 25 percent of Belarusians
with satellites.51
A foreign editor from Belsat TV was gracious enough to be interviewed for the purpose of
this thesis. In the conversation, he stressed that Belsat TV and other independent media outlets
are important for not only the Belarusian population but also for instilling proper practices,
ethics, and integrity amongst Belarusians engaged in the media profession. Upon return to their
country, Belarusian journalists that participate in foreign study visits or exchanges have few
48
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places to work other than the propaganda machines of state-run TV and radio stations. Having a
career in media is a hazardous occupation in Belarus, as the government frequently targets
independent or investigative journalists with harassment, intimidation, and incarceration to
control the flow of information reaching the public. Belsat TV and others provide a place to
work and continue their work as not only committed journalists but also as concerned citizens
aspiring to free their country from the grips of authoritarianism.
What is the relationship between the Polish government and these organizations? In order to
answer this, a questionnaire was sent out to a variety of Polish-based groups that are engaged in
Belarusian affairs. In addition to an editor from Belsat TV, the respondents include a specialist
from the Centre for Eastern Studies, a state-run analysis center; a project coordinator from the
Robert Schumann Foundation of Poland; a program director from the German Marshall
Foundation; and a program officer from a non-profit not affiliated directly with the Polish
government but also involved in assistance to Belarusian free media and civil society. From
those who either cooperated with or received financial assistance from the Polish government,
the impression was generally positive. In their professional experience, the Polish government is
committed to the democratization of Belarus, and is open to the recommendations and
suggestions of experts and specialists working with such components of democratization and the
construction of civil society, media, youth exchanges, and political opposition. Those who
replied said more often than not their “voice was heard” at the higher political levels, and that the
national government took into account many different opinions from various sources in
formulating their policy towards Belarus.
Not everyone had such a glowing perspective of the Polish government. The program officer
outside of the Polish government‟s influence was much more candid and disparaging about
Poland‟s role in supporting Belarusian civil society. One criticism he made was the very short
timeframe given to NGOs to produce results within the grant cycle. By the time the grants are
funded, recipients only have the summer months to implement their projects before the time
comes for end-of-the-year reporting. One cannot expect much progress to be made in such a
short period of time, particularly with such undertakings as constructing civil society, a very
long-term and complicated endeavor. Another observation given by him is that the Polish
government‟s operations in Belarus are ambiguous and shrouded in mystery. Aside from the
money reported in development co-operation reports and earmarked in the federal budgets, few
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outside of a select group within the Polish government know to whom the money is going in
Belarus, if at all. This arouses suspicion of the Polish government‟s activity in Belarus and feeds
into the Lukashenko‟s conspiracy theory that the Polish government is aiding subversive groups
in order to stage a coup and destabilize the country.

VII.

Education and Scholarships

In addition to civil society institutions, the Polish government is reaching out to future
generations of Eastern Europeans through stipends and scholarship funds for students. For
Belarusian students specifically, in 2006 the Polish government created the Konstanty
Kalinowski Scholarship Programme. The scholarship is available for any Belarusian student for
the nine-month academic year, but full-year scholarships for up to five years are available for
Belarusian students that have been expelled from their home institutions for political reasons.
The scholarship covers tuition, accommodation, and any fees for documentation and insurance—
PLN 1,240 is given to students every month to cover living expenses. The scholarship is
applicable for all areas of studies and at all public institutions of higher education in Poland; 360
students were awarded the Konstanty Kalinowski scholarship for the 2011/2012 academic year,
and as a result are receiving an education unavailable to them in Belarus.52
The Kalinowski scholarship provides an important opportunity to Belarusian students,
particularly those who otherwise could not pursue their studies because of the Belarusian regime.
Unfortunately, few scholarships like it exist. Using the example of the Centre for Eastern Studies
at the University of Warsaw, there are seven scholarship opportunities that receive funding from
the Polish government that are available for Belarusian students. However, these scholarships are
given to a handful of students annually and are open to all students from Eastern Europe, Russia,
the Balkans, the Caucasus region, and Central Asia. Therefore, these scholarships are highly
competitive. If a student is fortunate enough to receive one of these scholarships, the amount
awarded is small and would barely cover living expenses in Warsaw. Additionally, the
scholarships do not cover travel expenses, insurance, visas or residency permits, or
accommodation. It is foreseeable that these scholarships would end up as supplemental income
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to students that are wealthy enough to study abroad or receive their education at a foreign
university.
In addition, the Polish language obligations could also be problematic. Many of the
scholarships reviewed contain stipulations about submitting a thesis in Polish at the end, or
attending Polish lectures after the first year. Language courses are provided as part of the
scholarship, but even still this seems to require an exceptional mastery of the Polish language in
a very short period of time. Since many of the applicants probably have more experience in the
English language than the Polish language, scholarship recipients should be able to have greater
flexibility after the second year if they would like to study and write in Polish or continue with
English as their working language.

VIII. Conclusions
When communism fell, Poland was determined to aid Eastern Europe in the democratic
transition, Belarus included. Poland took the lessons learned from its own transition and applied
them to its assistance towards Belarus‟s politics, economy, and society. Progress was made, but
after Lukashenko came to power Poland-Belarus relations became frosty at best. With Poland
moving towards the west and Belarus moving towards the east, the border between them
metaphorically grew wider. Tensions between the two countries were strong in the 2000s due to
the oppression of the Polish minority by Belarusian authorities and the retreat from democratic
reform in the country. Therefore, Poland is trying to skip over Minsk and reach the Belarusian
people. Poland is doing this through channeling millions in assistance to Belarusian NGOs, TV
and radio stations, think tanks, and others. It is natural that Poland would target civil society as
the solution for Belarus because in Poland it was the actions by its own resilient civil society that
brought down communism. By supporting the population, Poland hopes to initiate change in
Belarus from the bottom-up rather than trying to persuade an egomaniacal, obstinate despot to
change.
It is difficult to assess success in a situation such as that prevailing in Belarus because
success is ultimately relative. A pessimist would see Belarus as an example of failed Polish/
western external intervention because Lukashenko is still in power and the Belarusian populace
is still confined by authoritarianism. Contrarily, the fact that despite seventeen years of
Lukashenko, there are still strains of opposition and dissent within Belarus is by virtue a success.
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In the context of constructive Polish support for Belarus, one must delineate Polish civil society
from the Polish government. After considerable research and deliberation, I have found that the
Polish government has indirectly accrued a certain level of success through its support of Polish
NGOs and other groups whose efforts are directed towards Belarus. The depth of Polish civil
society activity in Belarus covers a wide-array of themes, from the environment to
entrepreneurship. Cooperation between these groups and their counterparts in Belarus empowers
Belarusians and provides them with knowledge, experience, and opportunities that are either
anemic or non-existent in their own country.
Though the efforts of these organizations would not be possible without this funding, in a
strictly political sense the Polish government has made a number of gaffes that undermine
democratization in Belarus. For instance, in 2011 the Polish government handed over financial
information that was used in the arrest of human rights advocate Ales Bialatski.53 Also that year,
as stated before, Poland waived the visa fee for Belarusians travelling to Poland. While the fee
may be waived, the application process is the same. Belarusian citizens need a personal
invitation to travel to Poland. Also, Polish consulates are hesitant of allowing people, even ethnic
Poles, employed by the Belarusian government into Poland. In a country where the vast majority
of citizens are employed by the State, only a few benefit from this “new” visa policy. If anything,
travel between Belarus and Poland is as difficult as ever.
In this chapter, the development co-operation framework and Polish aid to Belarus was
emphasized because of Poland‟s persistent boasting that it is providing generous support and
assistance to democratization in Belarus. However, upon further scrutiny, the system has a
significant transparency deficit. From a researcher‟s perspective, the Polish aid system is
confusing and unclear. Both in Polish and in English, the documents available on the official
website, polishaid.gov.pl, are spotty and do not cover every year. The documents that are
available often have different sums of assistance, and it is quite difficult to understand what is
included and what is not included in any given total. To some extent, this is understandable
considering that the development co-operation is a recent addition to the Polish governmental
budgetary framework. Nevertheless, the reporting on development co-operation is important for
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the public and others to know that the money given is put to good use. Therefore, the system has
a way to go in terms of accessibility and clarity.
The problems of the Polish minority in Belarus were also prominent in this chapter. In this
author‟s opinion, the Polish minority in Belarus has played too strong of a role in shaping
Poland‟s foreign policy towards Belarus. The failed dialogue in 1990 and the ZPB conflicts in
2005 and 2010 demonstrated that the Polish government has seemed to be most interested in
Belarus when the Belarusian Poles are disenfranchised in some way. This was particularly true in
during the Ivanets dispute because Poland at the time was governed by the more nationalistoriented Kaczyński government; with the rhetoric and actions coming from Warsaw in terms of
sanctions and support, Belarusians and others got the impression that Poles were just looking out
for their own.
Finally, the Polish government has acted unilaterally at times when it was imprudent to do
so. In its public rhetoric, Poland presented itself as the vanguard of Belarusian democracy. Yet
when the European Community imposed political sanctions, Poland disagreed, and when the EU
wanted to take stronger action against Lukashenko following the 2010 election, the Polish
government waivered. This lack of cohesion amongst foreign actors has created a fragmented
political landscape in Europe and Lukashenko has exploited this in order to preserve his power.
However, this is not necessarily anyone‟s fault as it is largely symptomatic of the changing
political conditions in Europe. Since the fall of communism the continent has seen dramatic
changes. The European Union is largely responsible for these changes, but because the Union is
such a unique experiment in modern international relations, it‟s constantly evolving. It is only in
the past few years that that EU is beginning to synthesize foreign policy of the Member States
with the intentions of forming a coherent, united voice in the world and with third-party actors.
This chapter covered the period in which Poland joined the European Union, and after seven
years of membership Poland has adapted many aspects of its foreign policy to conform to a more
pan-European outlook. In the next chapter, the actions of the European Union towards Belarus
will be reviewed as well as how Poland is contributing to them. With such a large institution as
the European Union, does the old adage “strength in numbers” apply?
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CHAPTER 3: ESTRAGEMENT VS ENGAGEMENT:
The European Union’s Past, Present, and Potential
Strategies towards Belarus, and How Poland Can Help
While the previous chapter analyzed Belarus‟s relationship with its immediate neighbor
to the west, Poland, this chapter will expand the geopolitical scope and examine Belarus‟s
relationship with its much larger neighbor to the west, the European Union. While Poland has
persistently maintained some degree of interaction with Belarus after 1991, the EU froze out the
country in its external policy when it became clear that Belarus (or rather, Lukashenko) was
unwilling to implement political and economic reform.1 However, the European Union
reexamined its position towards Belarus after 2001. The change in opinion occurred, among
other reasons, because of an assessment by the OSCE that isolation by the EU and the greater
international community was neither beneficial to the Belarusian people nor reforms in the
country.2 This recommendation came at a time when the European Union was evaluating its
external relations with all of its surrounding countries, particularly in light of the impending
2004 EU enlargement. This shift led to a revised approach within the EU‟s Belarus strategy.
Unfortunately, the obstinate nature of Belarus‟s ruling regime created a pattern of “one
step forward, two steps back.” The European Union would make some headway with a
seemingly compliant Lukashenko, only to be rebuffed with further violations of human rights
and civil liberties and continued authoritarian rule. Currently, the EU is experimenting with a
number of initiatives designed to strengthen the ties between Europe and the east. Belarus‟s
participation is important, but the European Union has repeatedly said that further integration
into the European system is contingent on a number of reforms. Since 2004, Belarus has been on
the doorstep of the EU, but will Belarus come knocking?
This chapter will begin with a timeline of the EU‟s relationship with Belarus and the
various methods it has used to set it on a more European/ western trajectory. Particular attention
will be paid to the European Union‟s current programs, the European Neighborhood Policy and
the Eastern Partnership (aimed specifically at Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus). For the
purposes of this thesis, Poland‟s role in these programs will be an important component to the
1
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overall analysis. The chapter will conclude with an appraisal of the efforts made by the European
Union, the current outlook on prospective relations between Belarus and the European Union,
and where Poland fits in all of it.

I.

European assistance to Belarus during the 1990s

As mentioned in the introduction, diplomatic interaction between the European Union
and Belarus was brief following Belarus‟s independence. As with other former Soviet republics,
the European Union drafted a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Belarus. The
PCA would create new standards in trade, establish formal diplomatic and political relations, and
guarantee that assistance delivered by Europe to Belarus was appropriately used as well as
reflected progress in reforming the political and economic sectors.3 A PCA was drafted with
Belarus, but after Lukashenko won the presidency it was never fully ratified. In addition, after
the controversial elections in 1996, the European Union instituted the first round of sanctions
against Belarus and travel restrictions for select members of the ruling elite.
Though the European Union‟s efforts to negotiate with Lukashenko and his
administration were abandoned after 1997, this did not mean that Belarus as a whole was
excommunicated. The country was still eligible for the EU‟s Technical Aid to the
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) program. TACIS was the framework through
which financial assistance to CIS states was disseminated. The mission behind TACIS was to
first create an environment conducive to a market economy. With a stable economic situation, it
was assumed that democratic consolidation and good governance would ensue.4 This was
especially the case for Belarus, where the focus of technical assistance was to be a catalyst for
democratization. As Belarus was also deeply affected by the nuclear meltdown in Chernobyl,
millions of euros were given in the form of humanitarian and food aid. In total, Belarus received
€221 million in aid from the EU between 1991 and 2004.5
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Technical assistance to Belarus did not produce the level of progress that was initially
desired; both sides were culpable. In Belarus, Lukashenko wanted minimal international
intervention in Belarus, particularly from the European Union and the United States, because of
their presumed pre-existing prejudices and a strong distrust of western intentions. This was not
necessarily an unwarranted fear, since the stipulations demanding political reform would
undoubtedly compromise Lukashenko‟s hold on the presidency. Therefore, he made it very
difficult for any technical assistance or foreign aid to reach the targeted recipients.6 The
bureaucratic process in Belarus is lengthy and complicated, and because of such disincentives in
place to inhibit assistance from abroad, there was generally a lack of knowledge and capabilities
amongst the Belarusian population to effectively utilize the available funds.7 On the European
side, the bureaucracy was also a deterrent. The processing period is long, and even the EU
admits that their methods are somewhat inflexible; the requirements were rather grandiose, the
rules for delivery were too stringent, and the outlined objectives were unrealistic for Belarus‟s
situation.8 The quantity of funding was also problematic. The amount of aid given to Belarus
from 1991 to 2006 made the European Union Belarus‟s largest external source of assistance.9
However, this amount is paltry relative to the money given to Russia and Ukraine, which
together received around 75 percent of all TACIS funds.10 Even with assistance going to the
country, Belarus was no closer to embracing democracy.

II.

Belarus as part of the European “Neighbourhood”

In the early 2000s, the European Union‟s attitude towards the surrounding countries
began to change. As the EU was destined to expand its borders and include a diverse range of
new territories and border an even more diverse set of new countries, the role it played in the
region took on a new and important outlook. Ten years after the collapse of communism, the
political and economic landscape of Central and Eastern Europe was far from uniform. There
6
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were the hailed success stories of Central Europe and the Baltic States, the failure to democratize
in Belarus, and the in-between, quasi-democratic states such as Ukraine and Georgia. With the
EU growing in not only size but in power and influence, a new strategy was needed.
This evolution in thinking about EU external relations led to the advent to the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The policy was designed to create a zone of stability and
prosperity within the European sphere, specifically along the Mediterranean Sea, in the Near
East, and in the Eastern Europe/ South Caucasus region:
“The privileged relationship with neighbours will build on mutual commitment to
common values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the
respect for human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly
relations, and the principles of market economy and sustainable development.”11
Because of the variety of countries and cultures involved, Country Strategy Reports and Action
Plans were made on a case by case basis with each country to ensure that the EU was
appropriately addressing the specific problems and opportunities of each state. Essentially,
through a multilateral framework, the European Union looked to improve bilateral relations with
those countries bordering EU territory.
Belarus is not a full participant in the ENP; like before, full engagement and access to
ENP resources is contingent on political and economic reform occurring in the country.
Nevertheless, similar to TACIS, technical assistance and humanitarian aid is still given to
Belarus, only now it is disseminated through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership
Instrument (ENPI). Via the ENPI, Belarus received €5 million a year (approximately €0.50 per
capita).12 In order to assess the scope and aim of the ENPI, each country has a prepared National
Indicative Programme (NIP) that identifies key areas of interest and need for each country
covered. The NIP amount for Belarus was €46 million between 2007 and 2011. Once again, this
amount was low compared to other countries. Moldova, a country with half the population,
received €210 million, and Ukraine received €470 million between 2011 and 2013 alone.13 14

11

Commission of the European Communities, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper (2004): 3,
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf.
12
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument Belarus, 4.
13
Commission of the European Communities, Progress Report Republic of Moldova (2009): 21,
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/progress2009/sec09_514_en.pdf.
14
“EU supporting Ukraine’s reforms with €470.05 million in 2011-2013,” last modified 2011, http://www.enpiinfo.eu/files/publications/Ukraine%20NIP%202010.pdf.

Reinke 50

Despite the disappointing results from TACIS support to Belarus, the theory behind the
ENPI and the NIP is almost identical: by cultivating favorable economic and social conditions in
the country, democracy will follow. Regardless of the rhetoric from Brussels concerning the
importance of building democracy in Belarus, out of the €46 million earmarked for Belarus
under the 4-year NIP period, only €3.5 million per year was reserved for democratic
development and good governance.15 Most of the money went towards privatization efforts and
alleviating the lingering effects of Chernobyl on the population.
The European Neighbourhood Policy proved to be yet another impotent program in
bringing Belarus into the European sphere of influence. However, in 2008 there was renewed
hope in what was starting to look like a lost cause. In Belarus, Lukashenko revised his foreign
policy to be more “multi-vectored,” looking in other directions than the east. Though the
considerable money available to Belarus from the European Union was no doubt a factor in this
decision, Lukashenko‟s change of attitude was overwhelmingly due to the degenerating
relationship with Russia.
Lukashenko grew bitter over Russia‟s indifferent attitude towards the Russia-Belarus
Union, which for years was the focal point of his presidency.16 Likewise, Russia became
disheartened with Belarus and its waning support. Belarus‟s noncommittal disposition became
obvious when Belarus was reluctant to recognize the breakaway provinces of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. The most crushing blow to Russia-Belarus relations, however, was the energy dispute
at the end of 2006. Belarus‟s economic “success” is dependent on the copious amount of natural
gas and petroleum received from Russia at drastically reduced rates. When Russia demanded that
Belarus start paying regular prices for energy imports, Lukashenko was outraged. The dispute
was eventually mitigated, but not without a few humiliating concessions by Belarus; the price of
gas was to increase gradually until Belarus was paying market value. In addition, 50 percent of
the shares of Beltransgaz, Belarus‟s state energy company, were sold to Russian-owned
Gazprom.17
With Russia no longer being the reliable partner (i.e. subsidizer) it once was Lukashenko
was forced to look elsewhere for support. Therefore, his new strategy was to turn to the west in
15
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hopes of receiving handouts from European coffers in Brussels. To appease the EU‟s nagging
demands for reform in his country, Lukashenko made some changes. For instance, in 2008, the
For Freedom movement led by prominent anti-Lukashenko activist and 2006 presidential
candidate, Aleksandr Milinkevich, was officially registered in Belarus.18 Lukashenko also
released a number of political prisoners and dabbled in moderate economic liberalization.19 In
public, the Belarusian president spoke more favorably of the European Union and called for
closer cooperation in a variety of sectors. The European Union, excited to finally see a more
collegial Lukashenko, responded in full. In 2008, the Union relaxed the travel bans it had
imposed upon certain members of the Belarusian government. An official European Commission
document called “What the EU Can Bring to Belarus” outlined benefits of EU-Belarus
cooperation that could be achieved only once the Lukashenko government accepted twelve
points of democratization; as a gesture of compromise, these twelve points were reduced to
five.20 More importantly, however, was the agreement made in 2008 to install a permanent EU
representative office in Minsk. The Delegation of the European Union to Belarus as it is
officially called sent a strong message that the EU was committed to forging a new, closer
relationship with Belarus.21 This series of confidence-building events culminated with the EU
Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Benita FerreroWaldner, making an official visit to Minsk. Ferrero-Waldner met with Lukashenko and extolled
the steps happening in Belarus towards building a legitimate democracy.22 Not only did the
European Union laud Lukashenko for his good behavior, more money was also channeled to
Belarus. For the 2007-2010 NIP period, the budget for Belarus went from €20 million to €30
million, and an additional €16 million was set aside for the year 2011.23
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While the public discourse emanating from the EU and Belarus was optimistic, the reality
was something different. The “reform” taking place in Belarus was largely cosmetic; the political
environment was still very hostile towards opposition groups and civil society. At the beginning
of 2009, the European Parliament adopted a resolution acknowledging the progress made in
Belarus, but also reiterated that much more work was needed on behalf of Lukashenko‟s
government in the fields of political pluralism, economic liberalization, and respect for human
rights and minorities (the ZPB affair and the treatment of Belarusian Poles was specifically
mentioned).24 A few months later, the Parliament also reinstated the travel bans on Belarusian
officials that were lifted the previous year.25 EU-Belarus relations thawed somewhat, but aside
from a few lofty (and empty) proclamations both Brussels and Minsk were evading concrete
discussion on real change.

III.

The Eastern Partnership: promises and compromises

Lukashenko‟s willingness to comply with European standards was superficial. But
encouraged by the moderate level of progress, the European Union included Belarus in the new
project within the European Neighborhood Policy known as the Eastern Partnership (EaP). The
idea for an eastern component was in response to the new direction taken by the Neighborhood
Policy that propagated a more regionalized approach. Already in place was the Union of the
Mediterranean (UfM) that focused on North Africa and the Near East, and the Northern
Dimension that covered the Nordic countries, the Baltic States, and Russia.26 The Eastern
Partnership involves the EU and six countries: Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia,
and Georgia. The intent of the EaP is to strengthen and deepen the EU‟s ties and influence in the
region. Like the overarching ENP, the idea is that through multilateral cooperation, bilateral
relations between the EU and these countries will grow stronger. The EaP functions on the basis
of four platforms: democracy, good governance, and stability; economic integration and
24
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convergence with EU sectoral policies; energy security; and contacts between people.27 While
these are all noble causes, since EU interests in this region are motivated by energy, the
economic benefits are the driving force. The end goal for the European Union is to conclude
bilateral Association Agreements with the participating countries. A step-up from the preexisting PCA, the new Association Agreements “will provide for the establishment or the
objective of establishing deep and comprehensive free trade areas… between the EU and partner
countries, [which] could in the long-term perspective grow into a network of deep and
comprehensive free trade areas.”28
The Eastern Partnership was appealing to many in Europe for its potential. First off, the
disputes between the EU and Russia over energy brought into focus Europe‟s dependence on
natural resources from Eurasia. Developing a positive relationship with the countries in this area
meant a more stable supply of oil and natural gas. Because of the successes in Central Europe
and the Baltic, the EaP theoretically had a greater chance of success than, say, the Union for the
Mediterranean; Eastern Europeans were still “Europeans” and their ability to conform to
European norms and values was more probable than countries in Africa or the Middle East.
Furthermore, at a time when the European economy was sluggish and Europe was rather
strapped for cash, the Eastern Partnership, on paper, appeared fairly inexpensive. The money
going to the EaP had already been set aside through ENPI (approximately 1/3 of the total funds
for ENPI); additional resources would come in the form of credits for the European Investment
Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) as well as
voluntary contributions from Member States.29 Though the EaP funding wasn‟t going to break
the bank, it is still no small sum; the expected funds allotted for the Eastern Partnership are
projected to be €785 million in 2013.30 For Belarus, the constructive dialogue between the EU
and Lukashenko in 2008 and 2009 made a number of Member States see engagement as a more
effective strategy, as isolation wasn‟t bringing about the type of change Europe wanted to see in
Belarus.
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Nevertheless, the Eastern Partnership also faced its share of criticisms. One aspect that
weakened the EaP from the very beginning was how the Partnership would fit into the question
of EU membership. Countries like Ukraine and Moldova openly expressed their desire to
become Member States of the European Union, and thus far have oriented their foreign policy
and development to comply with the prerequisites for candidacy. Other states would enjoy the
fruits of closer cooperation with the EU, but are undecided if membership is a path they want to
take. In Belarus‟s case specifically, the internal politics and dependence on Russia make
membership out of the question, at least for the near future. Regardless of intentions, all partner
countries involved in the EaP are far from meeting the prerequisites for EU Member State
candidacy as outlined by the Copenhagen Criteria. With the European Union suffering from
“enlargement fatigue,” the Eastern Partnership represents (for the EU) a comfortable balance of
more cooperation without full-fledged integration. For the participating countries, however, there
was and still is fear that the formation of the Eastern Partnership will derail aspirations of
membership and leave Eastern Europe in EU limbo.
Yet another barrier to the Eastern Partnership‟s success that has grown stronger in 2010
is the state of the global economy. One of the original goals of the EaP was to introduce
economic reform in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus regions to make them more
compatible with the European/ western system. However, the worldwide economic crisis had a
very strong impact on Eastern Europe (even Belarus suffered a great deal, which is peculiar since
sanctions have made it an outlier in global trade). Therefore, the resources that were intended to
institute modernized standards and practices have become bailout funds for plummeting
economies. As the European Union is struggling to get its own fiscal house in order, EU Member
States are more concerned getting the European Union back on track before they assist their
worse-off neighbors.31 The Eastern Partnership is promising on paper, but these and other factors
are making the actual efficacy of the program extremely difficult.
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IV.

The Polish factor in EU-Belarus relations

Though the interest in Eastern Europe has been a rather recent phenomenon in Brussels,
Poland has long been an advocate for a stronger EU policy towards Eastern Europe.32 In many
ways Poland is leading by example. Poland saw its transformation into a free-market democratic
state as a model for other states to follow, particularly those in Eastern Europe. Organizations
such as the Polish Know-How Foundation provided aid as well as technical assistance and
expertise to transitional democracies for years.33 When Poland incorporated the development cooperation framework as the institutional system for delivering aid, Eastern Europe was a top
priority from the very beginning.34 Poland claims that it is one of the most ardent supporters of
Belarus at the European level, but is there substantial evidence to support this? If one scrutinizes
financial assistance to Belarus, Sweden is by far the largest donor within the European Union.35
Moreover, the ENP Country Strategy Paper for Belarus defines 21 categories of need in Belarus
(democracy-building, independent media, legal development, etc.). Poland supports four of these
categories, while Latvia and Lithuania, two other EU countries that border Belarus, support
twelve and eight respectively.36 In words, Poland has frequently called for Western Europe
deepening ties with the east, but has that translated into action from the Polish government at the
EU level?
The Eastern Partnership, by far Europe‟s most ambitious program in Eastern Europe
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, would not have happened if it wasn‟t for Poland; “For
Poland, the EaP kick-off is the result of a longstanding campaign to embolden the Union‟s
eastern policy, a drive which began when Poland wasn‟t yet a member of the EU.”37 The
proposal for the Eastern Partnership was sponsored by the Polish and Swedish governments, with
auxiliary support from the Czech Republic under whose EU presidency period the EaP was
launched.38 Though all parties deserve their share of credit, Poland has without a doubt been the
strongest proponent for the Eastern Partnership since its inception. In November 2010, a month
32
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before the presidential elections in Belarus, Sikorski visited the country stating that it was
imperative for the elections to meet international standards of fairness and transparency. Not
only would future prospects of cooperation within the Eastern Partnership be on the line, but if
accomplished a €3 billion loan from the EU would be waiting for Belarus afterwards.39 More and
more, Polish officials represent the public face for the Eastern Partnership, and Sikorski in
particular has assumed the dual character of Polish Foreign Minister and EU ambassador to
Eastern Europe.

V.

The 2011 Polish Presidency of the EU

From a synergetic perspective, 2011 looked to be an important year for the Eastern
Partnership. This was not only the year of the Eastern Partnership Summit, but also the Polish
Presidency of the Council of the European Union. With an important meeting set to occur at the

Celebrations honoring the Polish EU Presidency were staged in major cities across Poland. In Warsaw, a
young Polish woman looks out on the thousands of lanterns that were released into the night on July 1,
2011. Photo by Michael Anaya.

same time when Poland was at the helm of directing EU policy, the conditions were ripe for the
Eastern Partnership to take center-stage. For Poland in particular, now was an opportunity to
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assert itself as a key player in the European Union and as a regional actor between Eastern
Europe and the EU.
Poland assumed the Presidency of the Council of the European Union on July 1, 2011.
Like all Member States, Poland will hold the Presidency for a six-month period. While President,
Poland‟s responsibilities include chairing Council meetings and leading the Council (and the EU
as a whole) through effective management strategy and mediation.40 The objective of the
Presidency has changed since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty; the duties of the Presidency are
now divided and shared amongst the national Presidency and the permanent positions of Council
President and High Representative. As a result, the Presidency in the formal sense does not have
the power it once did, and is concerned more with technical and supervisory aspects.
Nevertheless, the Lisbon Treaty also guaranteed that co-decision procedure would be the
standard of EU decision-making. In this regard, the Presidency‟s role as an intermediary between
the various actors and institutions is essential to a well-functioning Union.41 The Presidency is an
important equalizer amongst large and small, old and new Member States, and allows countries
to set the tone of EU policy not only for that year but also for long-term programs and initiatives.
While holding the Council Presidency is not as significant as it once was, it still affects the
functioning of the EU and is a point of pride amongst individual European nation-states.
For Poland, the Presidency was an opportunity to showcase its leadership ability as well
as demonstrate that it is a dynamic and prominent actor in the European arena. This was also an
auspicious moment for the Eastern Partnership to gain attention and have the EU exact a
comprehensive, cohesive, and above all effectual policy towards the region. Poland persistently
argued for greater European involvement in the east, penned the Eastern Partnership initiative,
and now was at the helm of a main European institution; given these circumstances, it was an
optimal time for Eastern Europe to jump to the forefront of Europe‟s priorities.
In anticipation of the upcoming Council Presidency, the Polish government produced a
list of six priorities for its 2011 Presidential agenda. Developing the EU‟s financial framework
for 2014-2020 was at the top, followed by the Internal Market (particularly completing the single
market in the service sector), the Eastern Partnership, EU‟s energy policy, Common Security and
Defense Policy, and establishing a knowledge-based economy that would utilize Europe‟s
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intellectual resources.42 The diversity of these topics is impressive and, as in a national
presidency, each one is intended to encapsulate a different policy field, be it economics, political
cohesion, taking advantage of human capital, etc. Relations with Eastern Europe and the fruition
of the Eastern Partnership, therefore, would be the principle component to the EU‟s foreign
affairs dimension under the Polish presidency. Because of this, Poland highlighted the
importance of neighboring countries to the welfare of the EU. For the last six months of 2011,
Poland‟s intent in regard to third-party countries was to “extend the area of European values and
regulations through… the development of cooperation with neighbouring countries, the
promotion of European solutions at global forums, the building of deeper relations with strategic
partners and a wise and effective development policy.”43 Poland‟s list of priorities was
admittedly ambitious. Nevertheless, the government of Poland was confident that these topics
would be competently addressed during its Presidency.

VI.

The Warsaw Summit and Belarus’s withdrawal from the EaP

The Eastern Partnership Summit, the premiere EaP meeting for 2011, was held in the
middle of Poland‟s Presidential term. Heads of state, government representatives, and highranking officials from the European Union and EaP participant countries converged onto
Warsaw during the last weekend in September to discuss the status quo of the Eastern
Partnership and deliberate over the next step for the program. This Summit was the second one
of its kind since the inauguration of the EaP, and with two years of the program‟s existence it
was important to demonstrate progress and cite tangible results.
By the opening day of the Warsaw Summit, the Eastern Partnership could claim a
number of successes. An Association Agreement with Ukraine was in its final stages of
ratification. The establishment of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area with Ukraine, the
first of its kind within Eastern Partnership territory, was announced a few weeks after the

42

Krzysztof Śmiszek, “Equality and Non-Discrimination and the Priorities of the Polish EU Presidency,” Heinrich Böll
Stiftung, date accessed November 28, 2011, 2, http://www.boell.eu/downloads/Smiszek_SoP_final.pdf.
43
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Programme of the Polish Presidency of the Council of the
European Union (2011): 10,
http://pl2011.eu/sites/default/files/users/shared/o_prezydencja/programme_of_the_polish_presidency_of_the_c
ouncil_of_the_eu.pdf.

Reinke 59

Summit concluded.44 Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia are all in the negotiation
process for Association Agreements. Moldova and Ukraine joined the EU Energy Community
and are on the fast-track concerning future visa liberalization. Positive gains were made in the
Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum, an issue within the interest of both Poland and the
European Union. Concurrent with the meeting in Warsaw, the Eastern Partnership Business
Forum was launched in Sopot, targeting cooperation and dialogue within the private sector. Also
launched was the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly which hopes to connect members of the EU
Parliament with the parliaments of partner countries. The new Comprehensive Institution
Building project aims to develop systems and regulations to be on par with those in the EU. The
Eastern Partnership has and continues to expand from the confines of political and economic
associations into the areas of energy, environment, local governments, civil society, and
business.45 This increase in attention to Partnership countries has generally brought Eastern
Europe into a closer relationship with the EU: “Political and economic reforms have been
implemented in partner countries and relations between the EU and its Eastern European partners
have deepened significantly. There is more trade and economic interaction between the EU and
its Eastern European partners than ever before.”46 To demonstrate the EU‟s support for the
Eastern Partnership, the Union increased its financial contribution: “[President of the European
Commission] Barroso revealed additional funds for further development of the EaP in the next
multiannual financial framework for 2014-2020. Total financing of the Partnership has now
reached almost €2 billion.”47
It is important to recognize that progress has been made through the Eastern Partnership.
However, from much of the analysis and information about it, the tone of the Warsaw Summit
was decidedly phlegmatic. The primary dilemma facing a program like the Eastern Partnership is
that the magnitude of the problems in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus is enormous.
Overcoming these institutionalized and deep-seeded issues is not something that can be
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accomplished after only two years. While this is acknowledged by everyone involved in the
Eastern Partnership, there appears to be a general opinion that the outcomes to date have been
underwhelming. From the Eastern perspective, many thought that there would be concrete
agreements and treaties solidifying the supposed commitment of bringing the region within the
European sphere. Instead, the rhetoric delivered at the end of the Summit was dominated by
appeals for continued cooperation and work rather than actual achievements in the form of
treaties and trade agreements.48 Conversely, on the European side, there was an expectation that
partner states in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus would do more in their own countries to
democratize. The political circumstances in this part of the world are still very volatile and
significantly lacking in genuine democratic processes. Because of corruption and inconsistent
commitment to good governance, the Eastern Partnership or any method of assistance is
impeded.
Though the Warsaw Summit marked a number of gains and losses for other countries in
Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, for Belarus it was another failure. Due to the 2010 presidential
election and the enduring violation of his people‟s rights and freedoms, Lukashenko was not
invited to attend the Warsaw Summit. The invitation instead went to Belarus‟s Foreign Minister,
Serhiy Martynau. Martynau refused and in his place was designated the Ambassador of Belarus
to Poland—he also backed out at the last moment. In a governmental capacity, Belarus was
M.I.A. Despite Belarus‟s refusal, Brussels and Warsaw were not ready to give up on the country
altogether. Addressing those at the Warsaw Summit, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated
that if Lukashenko would fulfill certain reforms the European Union wanted, a €9 billion loan
would be available for Belarus.49 This is three times as much that was offered the previous year.
Despite the preposterously large amount of money offered, Lukashenko was unresponsive.
At the Summit a declaration was written voicing “deep concern” for Belarus‟s lack of
reform as well as the frequent citations of human rights abuses.50 However, there was no
recourse or consequence mentioned for Belarus, so the declaration was useless. The non-EU EaP
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countries refused to sign the declaration, which gave the paper even less credibility.51 Based on
research and analysis, the Eastern partners‟ reticence in speaking out against Belarus is mostly
for fear that it would draw too much attention to their own governments‟ commitment to
democracy. The fact that the EU, with all its influence, could not bring the EaP countries
together and make a unified statement about Belarus was rather embarrassing to the EU and the
Polish presidency. Even though the conclusion to the Belarus question at the Eastern Partnership
Summit was flaccid, the Belarusian government began another campaign of rabble-rousing. Both
Lukashenko and Martynau publicly chided the European Union for its discrimination against
Belarus and for ignoring the founding principles of the Eastern Partnership. Taking offense to the
European Union‟s position, Belarus quit the Eastern Partnership immediately following the
Warsaw Summit.52

VII.

Conclusions

Before and after joining the European Union, Poland has been a repeated advocate for the
European Union to invest more time and energy into Eastern Europe. Europe certainly saw the
benefits of a stable and prosperous eastern flank. However, much of its interest (and therefore
assistance) was focused on either more cooperative countries like Ukraine and Moldova,
unstable and violent countries like the Balkans, or countries relevant for energy, market, or
strategic concerns like Russia. In the priorities of the European Union, Belarus has often been the
forgotten country in Eastern Europe. Europe took a harder line than Poland on Belarus from the
beginning. While unfortunate, it is understandable that Belarus, a border country housing a
Polish national minority, couldn‟t be ignored by Poland as easily as by the European Union.
Though the Belarusian government was inimical, aid in the form of technical assistance
via the TACIS program and humanitarian relief was given by the European Union to Belarus.
Because of this, the European Union was and continues to be a substantial donor to the country.
However, the assistance granted to Belarus was impeded by a number of factors. Besides the
obvious domestic barriers, the aid was too difficult to access. The application process was
onerous, the rules were too constricting, and the report phase needed to be simplified. The
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projects that were funded by the EU were quite large and broadly-defined which hindered their
implementation. The Union also did not capitalize on knowledge and information from local
experts. The priorities of the aid were vague, and a general lack of transparency plagued the
entire process.53
The successes and failures in Central and Eastern Europe made the European Union
reevaluate its approach to the region, and from this the European Neighbourhood Policy came
into existence. The ENP differentiated the territory surrounding the EU and took into account
specific problems facing specific countries. In Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, the Eastern
Partnership was initiated within the European Neighbourhood Policy to support lagging
democracies and to boost weak economies. While the Eastern Partnership and the European
Neighbourhood Policy have been more able instruments for the European Union in some
respects, in Belarus it has still not produced any worthwhile results.
Based on my analysis, the EU‟s lack of success in instigating reform in Belarus is in part
due to two prevailing issues. The first is the absence of any valuable leverage the EU can use
against Belarus. One of the reasons Central Europe and the Baltic States were so successful as
post-communist transition states was because there was a clear objective: joining the European
Union. This goal was shared by both sides, and through demanding reform in exchange for
privileges, the European Union exercised considerable influence over these countries‟
development. Because this “carrot and stick” approach worked well in countries like Poland and
Estonia, the EU is recycling this formula, but without the explicit promise of EU membership.
Unfortunately, by the EU isolating Belarus for so long, there are little political and social
connections between the two that the Union can use to its advantage. The EU attempted to
rectify this through inviting Belarus to be a part of the Eastern Partnership. However, the benefits
of the EaP were inadequately defined and minimal, and the reforms demanded by the EU would
be the death knell to Lukashenko‟s regime. Belarus has resigned from the Eastern Partnership
and the EU is once again left with little bargaining power.
The second problem confronting the European Union in its relations with Belarus is its
erratic policy towards the country and the regime. While the situation in Belarus has been in
constant deterioration, the European Union‟s approach to Belarus has jumped around from
isolation to partial engagement to a convoluted amalgamation of the two. The messages coming
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from European press releases and summits frequently do not correspond to the actions and events
taking place. Even at the Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw, the European Union refused to
invite Lukashenko while simultaneously offered him €9 billion to correct problems that he
himself had created. This sort of muddled behavior sends a very mixed signal about the EU‟s
intention and its objectives in Belarus.
Not only is the European Union‟s political intent contradictory within itself, it is even
further disconnected by its economic policy; “From January 1993 to May 2005… [Belarusian]
exports to the EU increased from 27% to 44% of total exports.”54 In 2010, The Netherlands
received 11% of Belarusian exports, second only to Russia.55 Despite the political sanctions that
are in place, the EU is still a substantial trading partner with a country it repeatedly censures for
tyranny and oppression. The ineffective strategy is most aptly described by the “values/ security
nexus” developed by Dr. Giselle Bosse from the University of Maastricht. Essentially, the
European Union espouses magnanimous ambitions of liberating the downtrodden Belarusian
population from tyranny and diffusing European principles to Belarus; EU resolutions and
speeches are littered with references to championing democracy and promoting good governance
in the authoritarian state. However, in regards to funding and the EU‟s primary concerns,
democracy and freedom is often an afterthought to energy security and curbing cross-border
traffic and illegal immigration.56 Until now, the European Union as a whole has not been able to
devise a uniform strategy towards Belarus, and as a result the EU cannot make any sort of
headway toward the country‟s reform and democratization.
Though the European Union has been ineffective in changing the political situation in
Belarus, the European Union directly and indirectly has developed an appealing image for
Belarusian citizens. Belarusians, particularly young Belarusians, are an increasingly mobile
population and many work, travel, or study in the west.57 The majority of the Belarusians would
like to see closer cooperation with Europe compared to Russia. This feeling is especially strong
with those involved in the private/ business sector as western companies typically abide by a
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higher code of ethics than Russian businesses.58 If given the opportunity, Belarusians would like
to foster stronger bonds with Europe.
Poland has expressed the opinion that the European Union needs to pay more attention to
Eastern Europe. In the chapter detailing Polish-Belarusian relations, it was explained that on
more than one occasion Poland‟s policy towards Belarus has been out of sync with that of the
European Union. Nowadays, instead of acting independently, Poland is using its position as an
EU Member State to convince Brussels and others to rally around Eastern Europe. In the Union‟s
recent strategy towards Eastern Europe, democracy, good governance, and supporting civil
society are featured much more than before. These topics have been components of Poland‟s
objective in Eastern Europe for some time now, so this surge of interest on behalf of the EU is
indicative of Poland‟s influence on the Union‟s external affairs. The Eastern Partnership is by far
the best example of Poland‟s politicking between the European Union and the east. Successfully
bridging the east with the west was not only in the interest of the respective parties, but is also
beneficial for Poland. Successful sponsorship of an EU initiative would certainly give Poland
substantial clout in the European Union. In addition, with Poland being one of the countries on
the easternmost border of the EU, it has reaped other rewards for the EaP. The country has
received millions of euros in order to facilitate the Comprehensive Institution Building and
Cross-Border Cooperation programs.59 In addition to the Warsaw Summit, a number of forum
meetings have taken place in a number of Polish cities. This is not only good public relations but
generates revenue for Poland‟s tourism industry.
Progress within the Eastern Partnership was evident and more money was allotted, but
the enthusiasm felt towards the initiative varied. Multiple factors contribute to the lackluster
results. The democratic consolidation of the countries in the region has been moderate at best.
Even Ukraine, the most promising state in Eastern Europe, has been butting heads with European
officials due to the Yulia Timoshenko trial. Furthermore, the countries in Eastern Europe were
competing for attention and resources with the more “exciting” democratic revolutions occurring
in North Africa and the Middle East. The worsening economic crisis sweeping over Europe has
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added insult to injury. Currently, Europe is looking more southward and inward than towards the
east.
The Polish Council Presidency was determined to tackle a wide array of issues, the
Eastern Partnership being only one of them. While the Warsaw Summit did not satisfy the
expectations of some, Poland used this opportunity to reinvigorate, refocus, and re-strategize EU
aspirations for the east. Perhaps due to the more difficult and long-term aims of good governance
or civil society building, Poland as well as the EU emphasized the “contacts between people”
pillar and the opportunities for visa-free travel between countries. This was a wise move on
behalf of the Polish Presidency. Visa liberalization is one of the more attainable goals of the
Partnership, particularly for the near future, and it is one of the most popular deliverables to all
those involved. The Civil Society Forum and the Business Forum also have potential to reach out
to different sectors of the population that maybe are less engaged with politics and diplomacy
and could be a positive way to bypass some of the barriers imposed by the relatively illiberal
political systems still prevalent in Eastern Europe.
Belarus is no longer a participant in the Eastern Partnership. In addition, in a recent
closed parliamentary session the Belarusian government gave the KGB almost limitless power as
well as restricted any NGO or opposition group from holding a foreign bank account or receiving
assistance from abroad.60 Lukashenko is suffocating any threat to his power that exists within his
country. The EU and Poland have tried repeatedly, but the situation now seems as bleak as
ever—what should be the next course of action regarding Belarus?
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CONCLUSION: A EUROPEAN FUTURE FOR BELARUS?
Recommendations for Poland and the EU in future assistance to Belarus

This thesis has examined Poland and the European Union‟s relationships with Belarus as
well as their respective reactions to the deteriorating situation concerning human rights and
democratic governance occurring within the country. One of the objectives of such an analysis is
to explore the ability of Poland, a post-communist state with close ties to Eastern Europe, to
influence the EU‟s policy towards the east. After careful research and consideration, this study‟s
assessment of the outcome is mixed. Generally, since 2008 Poland has made strides in becoming
a more salient intermediary between the EU and Eastern Europe. Countries like Ukraine and
Moldova are growing closer to Europe in terms of both economic and political cooperation.
Through the Eastern Partnership, a predominantly Polish initiative, the European Union has both
an increased presence in the region and has postulated clearer goals for the eastern neighbors,
such as Association Agreements and easing travel restrictions. Through business and civil
society platforms affiliated with the Eastern Partnership, the European Union is engaging with
more than just political figures and is now working with private and public sectors in Eastern
Europe, the Caucasus region, and Central Asia. Attention to this region is as high as it has been
since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and this interest has translated into tangible results.
Despite the progress made with some countries, there is still much work that has to be done
in establishing democracy in Eastern Europe and strengthening bonds between the EU and the
east; the most striking example of this is Belarus. After 20 years the EU and Belarus are still at
odds, and Belarus continues to be in the grips of authoritarianism. Poland, Belarus‟s western
neighbor and self-proclaimed champion of Belarus‟s struggle for democracy and human rights in
Brussels, has also been unable to instigate reform in the country. Why have both Poland and the
EU been unsuccessful in improving the situation in Belarus?
The EU and Poland‟s failure in Belarus is both endemic to the situation in Belarus and
systemic of the European Union‟s ability to act unilaterally in matters of foreign policy. As
demonstrated in the chapters of this thesis, the European Union and Poland‟s positions on
Belarus have been out of sync for too long. A united and unfaltering stance that combined
Poland‟s (particularly Polish civil society) expertise with the European Union‟s power and
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resources could have made more of an impact. Instead, the response to Belarus has been
haphazard and uncoordinated. In addition to the incompatible positions taken by Poland and the
European Union, the political policies do not correspond with the economic policies. These
inconsistencies weaken both Poland and the EU‟s ability to influence or encourage reform in the
country. It must be noted, however, that this is not something that can be changed easily because
at the heart of this problem is the absence of a single Common Foreign Security Policy within
the European Union‟s external action framework. The European Union is, at its core, a zone of
economic cooperation and trade that has evolved to be a supranational institution; in the past
foreign relations and external policy were conducted by national governments through preexisting diplomatic forums (such as the UN) or, for defense, multilateral frameworks (such as
NATO).61 To meet the demands of the European Union as a global actor, this is gradually
changing. As mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, the Treaty of Amsterdam installed the
idea that the Union adopting a Common Foreign Security Policy, which is essential to fulfill the
mounting responsibilities of the Union in the world. Also, the European Union‟s pillar structure,
a significant factor standing in the way of the EU adopting a comprehensive CFSP, has been
abolished as part of the Lisbon Treaty.62 Though the Union is slowly adopting more flexibility to
act in matters of foreign policy, external relations remain within the competences of the Member
States, and there exists a reluctance to surrender this type of sovereign authority to a
supranational body. At the time of writing this thesis there is no clear answer as to if, when, or
how these institutional discrepancies will be rectified. Given the current circumstances, what can
the EU and Member States do for Belarus, and what is the future outlook of the situation in
Belarus?

I.

Lukashenko’s future as the president of Belarus: prolonged but in peril

As this thesis has shown, Lukashenko‟s foreign policy has bounced back and forth between
Russia and the European Union. Though this flip-flopping makes Lukashenko seem erratic, one
factor in Lukashenko‟s foreign policy has remained constant: Lukashenko will do anything, and
cooperate with anyone, in order to maintain power. While in the past he has successfully played
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the European Union and Russia against each other to stay in control, this is no longer the case. In
the first chapter of this thesis, Belarus‟s historical relationship to its neighbors was described as
being between a rock and a hard place. Similar to his country‟s history, President Lukashenko is
caught between both international and domestic pressure that compromise his power in a way he
has never before experienced.
When Lukashenko seemed more willing to work with the European Union starting in 2008,
Brussels backed off some of its demands for reform. After the 2010 presidential elections,
however, the European Union learned the hard way that any concessions made to Lukashenko
will not coax him towards reforming Belarus, and instead only appease his harsh rule. Therefore,
it appears as if the EU is only willing to negotiate with Lukashenko if all of its demands are met.
An example of this is the release and rehabilitation of all, not some, political prisoners in
Belarus. Not only do these conditions apply to Belarus‟s relationship with the EU, but also to
institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank in which EU countries have extensive leverage.
Essentially, the EU has wised up to Lukashenko, and it‟s going to be extremely difficult if not
impossible for him to receive any loans or assistance from western organizations if the
conditions in Belarus do not change.
When the west turned its back to Lukashenko, he could always turn to Russia as an ally and a
benefactor. However, the relationship between Minsk and Moscow is not the same as it once
was. Being that Belarus is an unreliable economic partner, Russia is also demanding certain
stipulations for Belarus if Lukashenko wants to continue to receive assistance. Along with
increased privatization, Russia also wants Belarus to adopt the Russian ruble as its official
currency and sell the remaining shares of Beltransgaz to Gazprom. By ceding more power to
Russia, Lukashenko runs the risk of losing his presidency, or at least becoming a puppet for
Russian leaders that can be easily replaced if Moscow wills it.
Based on this author‟s research, Lukashenko has only managed to retain any popular support
in his country because of two reasons: economic stability and security. Both of these have been
severely crippled in 2011. Belarus is fueled both figuratively and literally by Russian oil and
natural gas sold to refineries at discount prices. This allowed the economy, which has barely
evolved since the days of the Soviet Union, to function despite its deep flaws.63 Now that Belarus
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is expected to pay Russian companies market prices for oil, it no longer retains the edge that kept
its economy afloat. In 2011, cracks began to appear in Belarus‟s supposed “prosperous”
economic model. Belarus‟s currency has devalued more than 50 percent since the government
removed the fixed exchange rate. Reminiscent of the product shortages in the early 1990s,
Belarusians were standing in long lines for days last spring to exchange rubles for dollars and
euros. Because of rising inflation, Lukashenko has increased social benefits and pensions in
order to placate Belarusian citizens and avoid mass dissent. However, with little money flowing
from an unproductive economic system and the lack of foreign aid coming in from the outside
sources, Belarus will undoubtedly go bankrupt.64
In addition to artificially shielding Belarus from economic hardship, Lukashenko also
claimed to provide security to his citizens. However, Lukashenko has also lost considerable
credibility in this regard. The violence following the December presidential election, sparked by
the aggression of authorities, was hardly an example of maintaining peace in the country. In
April of 2011, a terrorist attack on a Minsk subway left thirteen people dead and many more
injured. While there are no immediate threats abroad, Lukashenko‟s behavior in the world has
left him and his country with very few friends and even more enemies in the international
community. Though Lukashenko has for years relied on his citizens feeling safe within their
country to keep himself in power, nowadays Belarusians are neither personally nor financially
secure.
The situation in Belarus is not sustainable. Lukashenko has very few options at this point,
and regardless of what he does or does not do, his role as president of Belarus is in jeopardy.
Since the violence following the elections in 2011, Lukashenko has further clamped down on
opposition movements, civil society, and greatly expanded the powers of the secret police. In this
author‟s opinion, this behavior is not out of malevolence but out of fear. Lukashenko is keenly
aware of his unpopularity and growing unrest in his country, and as a result is lashing out in
every direction, desperately trying to suppress any opposition to his power. Predictions in
international relations are always difficult to make. In the case of Belarus, there exist two wild
cards: Russia and Lukashenko. The actions of either could change the situation entirely. In
reality, since the European Union and Russia are both growing weary of Lukashenko, the
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adoption of a common position by both Moscow and Brussels would potentially be the most
effective strategy in dealing with Lukashenko. However, because of the absence of a concrete
Russia policy taken by the EU as well as Russia‟s recent fraudulent parliamentary elections, the
odds of this happening are slim. Regardless, if the European Union holds its ground on human
rights improving in Belarus, and if Russia does not come to the aid of Lukashenko as it has in the
past, Lukashenko‟s years as president are numbered.

II.

Prospective programs for facilitating democratization in Belarus

The situation in Belarus cannot be solved exclusively from abroad. Belarusians must take the
problems of democratization and good governance into their own hands for there to be real and
long-lasting change. However, after extensive research and analysis of the current debates taking
place in Europe, there are a number of options the European Union can take to aid
democratization in Belarus, all of which can be achieved with Poland‟s support.
One of the most promising instruments in facilitating democratization in Belarus would be
the establishment of a European Endowment for Democracy (EED). The idea for a European
Endowment for Democracy was inspired by the United States‟ National Endowment for
Democracy and would serve as a framework to promote democracy and good governance that
correlate with European standards. A European Endowment for Democracy could correct the
two persistent problems that currently exist in delivering assistance to democracy around the
world: flexibility (given the rigidity of current European institutions) and the annual grantmaking calendar (a dilemma mentioned by one of the interviewees for this thesis). Also, creating
an endowment that would exclusively focus on democratization would free up other
organizations, such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights, to focus on
matters relating to international development and addressing human rights abroad. The idea for
the EED was proposed by Sikorski in order to provide a platform within the European Union that
specifically addresses democratization, something important for both Polish and European
foreign policy.65 The establishment of the Endowment would be a great step not only for the
European Union but also a success for Poland at the EU level. However, for a European
Endowment for Democracy to flourish, there are two elements that need to be taken into
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consideration. The first is to avoid redundancy. “Democratization” can be a vague term, and
there are already a number of think tanks, foundations, and EU departments that work with
components of democracy, such as formulating political parties and election monitoring. The
EED should make its directives clear and its intentions specific enough to avoid duplication with
other similarly-minded initiatives or projects taken on by the Union or other Member States.66
Additionally, Poland and the European Union must find an appropriate time to launch the
Endowment. While the idea of creating the EED has received popular support in Europe,
particularly from such important actors like France and Sweden, given the current economic
situation Member States are not exactly enthusiastic about contributing more money to European
projects, particularly ones that to some may not be seen as “pressing” or “urgent.” While the
Polish government is eager to get the EED underway during their EU Presidency, if the process
for starting the Endowment is rushed through without it being well-planned and lacking panEuropean support, it is not going to succeed. The Polish government is the most ardent supporter
of the EED, but it is going to require a certain sharpness and political finesse on behalf of Poles
to make the Endowment a reality.
Given the situation in Belarus, unfortunately democracy is not going to be possible as long as
Lukashenko is president. As explained before, how long he will have left as president remains to
be seen. Nevertheless, given the current circumstances Poland and the European Union only
have so much room to maneuver as external actors. At the moment, both Poland and EU should
focus on visa liberalization for Belarusian citizens and expanding scholarship opportunities for
Belarusian students. Future generations are going to be essential to Belarus‟s inevitable
democratic revolution; perhaps the Vaćlav Havel or Lech Wałęsa of Belarus is sitting in a lecture
hall in Kraków or Poznań learning the tenants of a functioning and thriving democratic system.
Through studying abroad Belarusians can also become more exposed to western democracies as
well as develop personal and professional contacts abroad. Countries like Poland would be ideal
candidate countries for these types of opportunities because of their geographic proximity to
Belarus (aka less expensive to travel) and for the lower cost of living compared to Western
European countries.
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A number of experts on Belarus have proposed ostracizing Lukashenko but engaging with
other members of the Belarusian government as one method of dealing with the Belarusian
government. By isolating the leader but cooperating with other “technocrats,” western
governments make valuable allies in the current regime that could prove useful during any future
transition. A similar strategy was used effectively in Europe‟s response to Slobadon Milošević in
Serbia. Also, these figures not only hold prominent positions in the Belarusian government but
are many times within Lukashenko‟s influential inner circle.67 Assessing certain high-ranking
Belarusians on a case-by-case basis could prove to be helpful in achieving western objectives for
a democratic Belarus, although Poland and the European Union must tread carefully when
approaching these individuals. The most likely scenario would be that these technocrats would
be successful in persuading Lukashenko to accept certain economic reforms and allow more
privatization of Belarusian companies. While the direct and indirect consequences of
implementing more free-market reforms in the Belarusian economy could contribute to an
overall democratization of Belarus, the country runs the very real risk of these entrepreneurs
taking advantage of the system and establishing an oligarchy similar to what exists in Russia and
Ukraine. Therefore, it is in the opinion of the author that the European Union and Poland should
work together in standing up against the tyranny of Lukashenko and reaching out to young
Belarusians as well as Belarusian civil society through regional cooperative initiatives (like the
Eastern Partnership) and through a flexible, well-developed endowment.

III.

Final Thoughts

Within the context of Poland being an influential regional actor between the European Union
and Eastern Europe (particularly Belarus), the true test of Poland‟s ability to bridge the two is
just beginning. Belarus has drifted in and out of Brussels‟ agenda ever since the collapse of the
Soviet Union. Because of Belarus‟s withdrawal from the Eastern Partnership, the current
economic crisis in Europe, and the democratization that is occurring in other parts of the
European Union, it is likely that once again Belarus is going to slip away from the consciousness
of most Europeans, and as a result the situation will continue to vitiate. If Poland is the vanguard
of Belarusian democratization and the champion of Belarus at the European level, it is
imperative that Poland continues to keep the rest of Europe abreast with what is happening in
67
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Belarus, and convince the European Union that the democratization of Belarus should continue
to be a priority. Through a regional dynamic, democracy in Belarus can take one step closer to
becoming a reality.
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Projects funded by the Polish MFA through the special competition,
Support for Belarusian Society 2011

Organization

Project Title

Angelus Silesius Meeting
House
The Freedom and Democracy
Foundation
Helsinki Foundation for Human
Rights
Happy Childhood Foundation

Citizen education as a development tool for
social participation in Grodno
“Heartland of free speech”- Belarusian media
watch
Human rights education in Belarusian schools
Social youth exchange initiative

98,897

Helsinki Foundation for Human
Rights

Supporting activities of the international
committee for the control of human rights in
Belarus
Support for the development of entrepreneurship
in agriculture in areas of rural Belarus

188,130

Local development leaders in Belarus

170,780

The support of private passenger transportation
companies by activating passenger transport
association
Improving the quality of services provided by
Belarusian legal advisory offices
Support of non-formal education in Belarus

113,200

Support for scientists from Grodno in developing
international scientific contacts through
participation in international scientific events in
Poland and Belarus
EU countries for supporting the opposition and
civil society in Belarus
Building bridges- partnership development!

48,550

Żuławski Association,
Department of Science and
Technology for Agriculture
Technology and Engineering
(Stare Pole)
School of Public Administration
(Szczeczin)
CASE Belarus

Legal Clinics Foundation
Foundation for European
Studies
Fundacja na Rzecz Dzieci
Zagłębia Miedziowego

Solidarity with Democratic
Belarus
Sempre a Frente Foundation
Institute of Public Affairs
Foundation

For Our Freedom and Yours
Fundacja Swietego Mikolaja
Józef Mianowski Fund
Centre of Civil Education
Poland-Belarus
Young Artists Association

Grant Amount
(PLN)
124,165
250,390
152,360

503,838

57,750
91,303

385,050
115,130

Partners in Europe: Warsaw-Brussels-Minsk.
Study visits on the theme of European
integration for Belarusian youth leaders of public
opinion
Belarus and the EU- the ways of rapprochement

146,835

Music, theatre, and cinematographic workshops
for children and youth in Belarus
A foundation for the promotion of science:
scholarship program for Belarusian scientists
Good practices of transborder journalism:
Poland-Belarus
“Towards the theatre”: unknown art- initiatives for
the promotion of culture (in this: publishing artists

90,450

265,080

142,240
69,950
200,195
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Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College
of Eastern Europe
Lazarski University

publication) through the active support of
Belarusian organizations and social
organizations at the local level
Civil Grodno

243,478

Larzarski University Belarusian scholarship
program
Best Polish experience in supporting local
entrepreneurship e and micro-entrepreneurs
association
“National solidarity” integration campaign for
active representatives of civil society in Belarus
Białystok: from 270

102,900

DEMO! Democracy-Education-Media-Civics

96,758

Robert Schuman Foundation of
Poland
East European Democratic
Association
Fundacja Rozwiń Skrzydła

Trip to Europe: guide about travel opportunities
and science in Europe for Belarusian citizens
Increasing access to independent information in
regions of Belarus
Not near, but together

45,150

Institutum Orientalium
Foundation

“Entrepreneurship in Belarus”- Polish
entrepreneurs for supporting local
entrepreneurship in Belarus
Environmental Aid Club

295,100

Journalism competition for local communication
problems
Association uniting small and medium-sized
companies to initiate the development sector in
Belarus

178,440

Community Development
Society (Płużnica Municipality)
Solidarity with Democratic
Belarus
ZHP (Polish Scouting and
Guiding Association)
The New Media Foundation

Fundacja Rozwiń Skrzydła
Polish Aid Foundation
Institute for Eastern Studies

TOTAL

124,780

267,600
59,650

696,320
83,480

171,479

193,160

5,772,588
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